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The Price of Justice: An Analysis of the Costs that are 
Appropriately Considered in a Cost-based 
Vindication of Statutory Rights Defense to an 
Arbitration Agreement 
Ramona L. Lampley∗ 
ABSTRACT 
In the wake of AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, parties opposing 
enforcement of an arbitration agreement with a class waiver increasingly relied 
on the prohibitive-costs-based vindication of statutory rights defense. The 
Supreme Court recently held in American Express Co. v. Italian Colors 
Restaurant that the effective vindication doctrine cannot be used to invalidate 
an otherwise enforceable arbitration agreement with class-action waiver simply 
because the opponents have no “economic incentive” to pursue individual 
arbitration. However, the Court’s bases for this holding are unclear and 
unnecessarily call into question the very existence of the “effective vindication 
doctrine.” This Article examines the historical underpinnings of the 
prohibitive-costs-based defense and the different frameworks courts have 
employed to analyze those costs. These approaches can be summarized as (1) the 
subjective approach, which compares the costs of arbitration to the litigant’s 
ability to pay; (2) the comparative approach, which compares the costs of 
arbitration to the costs of proceeding in litigation; (3) the cost/benefit approach, 
which compares the costs of arbitration to the likelihood of the plaintiff’s 
potential recovery; and (4) the incentive-based approach, which considers 
whether the plaintiffs or their potential attorneys have any incentive, given the 
costs involved, to pursue their claims. This Article concludes that the 
comparative approach is the only approach that is both grounded in the text of 
the Court’s vindication of statutory rights jurisprudence and serves the purposes 
of the FAA and enforcing statutory rights. 
 
* Ramona L. Lampley is an Assistant Professor of Law at St. Mary’s University School of 
Law, where her scholarship focuses on arbitration in the consumer products, commercial, and 
employment settings. Many thanks to Stephen Ware, Colin Marks, Dorie Klein, and Amy 
Hardberger for their valued comments and suggestions. Additional thanks are due to my 
research assistants, Alyse Haugen and Leigh Woitena, for their diligent research. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Recent Supreme Court jurisprudence has given an effective 
“thumbs up” to arbitration. The Court has held that states may not 
treat arbitration clauses with disfavor simply because they involve 
low-value consumer claims;1 that states may not invalidate pre-
 
 1. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1750 (2011) (holding that the 
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dispute arbitration agreements that include personal injury claims on 
the basis of public policy;2 and that federal statutes that prevent 
waiver of their substantive rights do not imply a guarantee of a 
judicial forum unless that forum is specifically required by statute.3 
Most recently, the Court held that an arbitration agreement with 
class waiver was enforceable in American Express Co. v. Italian Colors 
Restaurant, even though the opponents to the agreement argued that 
without a class mechanism, they had no economic incentive to 
pursue their federal antitrust claims.4 
The clear directive by the Court is that under the Federal 
Arbitration Act (“FAA”),5 arbitration is a perfectly acceptable 
alternative to litigation. Some commentators have argued that this 
thwarts access to the courts envisioned by eighteenth-century 
norms;6 others have urged Congress to limit the FAA and explicitly 
preclude the use of the class waiver.7 Further, courts were split as to 
the implication of the Court’s recent arbitration cases.8 While it is 
 
Federal Arbitration Act preempts California’s state law rule that “interferes” with arbitration, by 
requiring it ex post). 
 2. Marmet Health Care Ctr., Inc. v. Brown, 132 S. Ct. 1201, 1203–04 (2012) (“West 
Virginia’s prohibition against pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate personal-injury or wrongful-
death claims against nursing homes is a categorical rule prohibiting arbitration of a particular 
type of claim, and that rule is contrary to the terms and coverage of the FAA.”). 
 3. CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665, 672–73 (2012) (holding that the 
Credit Repair Organizations Act’s grant of a “right to sue” coupled with a provision that 
rendered void any substantive right provided by Act did not render claims arising under the Act 
inarbitrable). 
 4. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2310 (2013) The question 
presented was “[w]hether the Federal Arbitration Act permits courts, invoking the federal 
substantive law of arbitrability, to invalidate arbitration agreements on the ground that they do 
not permit class arbitration of a federal-law claim.” Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Am. Express, 
133 S. Ct. at 594 (No. 12-133), 2012 WL 3091064 at * i (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 5. 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (2000). 
 6. Judith Resnik, Fairness in Numbers: A Comment on AT&T v. Concepcion, Wal-Mart v. 
Dukes, and Turner v. Rogers, 125 HARV. L. REV. 78, 168–70 (2011). 
 7. Ann Marie Tracey & Shelley McGill, Seeking A Rational Lawyer for Consumer Claims 
After the Supreme Court Disconnects Consumers in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 45 LOY. L.A. L. 
REV. 435, 473 (2012) (arguing that “Congress should invalidate waivers of collective consumer 
action along with pre-dispute arbitration agreements”). 
 8. See, e.g., In re Am. Express Merch. Litig., 667 F.3d 204, 207 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. 
granted, 133 S. Ct. 594 (2012), and overruled by American Express, 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2310 (2013) 
[hereinafter Amex III]; Coneff v. AT&T Corp., 673 F.3d 1155, 1159-1161 n.3 (9th Cir. 2012) 
(distinguishing Amex III, but then, in an enigmatic footnote, stating that “to the extent that the 
Second Circuit’s opinion is not distinguishable, we disagree with it and agree instead with the 
Eleventh Circuit”). As Coneff recognizes, the federal appellate courts are split as to whether, 
post-Concepcion, an arbitration agreement can be held unenforceable because, in light of the costs 
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now settled that California’s Discover Bank rule (rendering 
unenforceable arbitration agreements with class-action waivers that 
“predictably involve small amounts”) is preempted as a state law 
unconscionability defense of wide applicability,9 the Second Circuit 
held that an arbitration agreement is not enforceable when it 
deprives prospective litigants of the opportunity to vindicate federal 
statutory rights due to a class waiver.10 This breathed new life into 
the vindication of statutory rights defense that is sometimes used to 
avoid otherwise enforceable arbitration agreements.11 Indeed, critics 
of the enforceability of arbitration agreements in the context of “low 
value” claims turned to the vindication of statutory rights defense as 
the last major defense following the Supreme Court’s decision in 
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion.12 
The questions arising from the use of this judicially created 
defense and from the Court’s decision in American Express abound: 
(1) Is the vindication of statutory rights defense based on mere dicta, 
or should it survive the Court’s recent pro-arbitration 
 
of individual claims, there is no incentive for individual claimants to pursue statutory rights. 
Coneff, 673 F.3d at n.3. Curiously, the Ninth Circuit in Coneff aligned itself with the Eleventh 
Circuit’s decision in Cruz v. Cingular Wireless. 648 F.3d 1205, 1215 (11th Cir. 2011). But the 
Eleventh Circuit specifically declined to address whether an arbitration agreement could be 
invalidated on public policy grounds when the effect is to foreclose low-value claims because the 
Supreme Court had already held that the same arbitration agreement at issue in Cruz was 
sufficient to make the plaintiffs “whole” in Concepcion. Id. 
 9. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1746, 1750 (2011) (quoting 
Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1110 (Cal. 2005)). 
 10. Amex III, 667 F.3d at 217–19 (holding that “[t]he evidence presented by plaintiffs 
here establishes, as a matter of law, that the cost of plaintiffs’ individually arbitrating their 
dispute with Amex would be prohibitive, effectively depriving plaintiffs of the statutory 
protections of the antitrust laws”). 
 11. In re Am. Express Merch. Litig., 681 F.3d 139 (2d Cir. 2012) (denying petition for 
rehearing en banc in Amex III) (Jacobs, J., dissenting) (claiming that en banc review is needed 
because “[A] the panel opinion is unbounded and can be employed to defeat class-action waivers 
altogether; [B] it makes the district court the initial theater of arbitral conflict on the merits 
(how else does a district court estimate the cost of a litigation?); and [C] it is already working 
mischief in the district courts”). Five judges would have granted the petition for rehearing en 
banc in Amex III. Id. 
 12. See, e.g., Myriam Gilles, Killing Them with Kindness: Examining “Consumer-Friendly” 
Arbitration Clauses After AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 825, 826 (2012) 
(arguing that the defense can even be applied to state law rights); see also Myriam Gilles & Gary 
Friedman, After Class: Aggregate Litigation in the Wake of AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 79 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 623, 647–52 (2012) (arguing that the “effective vindication” doctrine, “properly framed” 
is available under state law when the class waiver operates to exculpate or confer de facto 
immunity on the defendant, and implicates state common law policy against exculpatory 
contracts). 
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jurisprudence?;13 (2) If the vindication of statutory rights defense is 
viable, and I believe it is, does it only apply to enforcement of federal 
statutory rights?; and (3) In a defense based on prohibitive costs to 
arbitration, what is the proper framework for analyzing those costs? 
As the use of binding arbitration agreements has increased in 
popularity in all contexts—commercial, employment, consumer 
products, and even health care—the question of when and how such 
agreements should be enforced has received much debate.14 This is 
exacerbated by the increased presence of the class-action and 
arbitration waiver found in many arbitration agreements.15 As the 
Court recently noted, arbitration is ill-suited for adjudicating matters 
based on class representation—thus, it seems that arbitration will 
proceed individually, unless otherwise agreed to by the parties, or 
not at all.16 
Critics of arbitration reacted to the class waiver in arbitration 
agreements by arguing that such waivers should not be enforced 
under two rubrics: state law unconscionability defenses and on the 
basis that they deprive litigants of vindicating statutory rights 
 
 13. The Court’s decision in American Express calls the continued viability of this doctrine 
into question. Justice Scalia writes that the “effective vindication” exception to arbitration 
originated as “dictum” in Mitsubishi Motors. American Express, 133 S. Ct. at 2310. Scalia also 
opines that “the Court in Mitsubishi Motors did not hold that federal statutory claims are subject 
to arbitration so long as the claimant may effectively vindicate his rights in the arbitral forum.” 
Id. at n.2 (emphasis added). But many people, myself and Justice Kagan writing for the dissent 
included, would argue that Mitsubishi squarely held just that: “An arbitration clause will be 
enforced only ‘so long as the prospective litigant effectively may vindicate its statutory cause of 
action in the arbitral forum.’” Id. at 2314 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (quoting Mitsubishi Motors 
Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 637 (1985)). 
 14. See, e.g., Ramona L. Lampley, Is Arbitration Under Attack?: Exploring the Recent Judicial 
Skepticism of the Class Arbitration Waiver and Innovative Solutions to the Unsettled Legal Landscape, 18 
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 477, 478–82 (2009) (analyzing the evolution and use of arbitration 
agreements in consumer products and services). For a history of the adoption of the consumer 
product arbitration agreement, see Jeffrey W. Stempel, Mandating Minimum Quality in Mass 
Arbitration, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 383, 398 (2008) (“The practical consequences of the new legal era 
were significant. Arbitration left the province of particular business guilds or commercial 
environments and shifted to a massive privatization of the adjudicatory function. . . . [A] genre 
of new arbitration arose, in which arbitration agreements were essentially imposed upon a large, 
general class of consumers and workers.”), and Myriam Gilles, Opting out of Liability: The 
Forthcoming, Near-Total Demise of the Modern Class Action, 104 MICH. L. REV. 373, 394–98 (2005). 
As evidenced by Marmet Health Care Ctr., Inc. v. Brown, 132 S. Ct. 1201, 1203–04 (2012), the use 
of pre-dispute arbitration agreements is being adopted even in the health care industry. 
 15. See Lampley, supra note 14 at 503–17 (discussing the evolution of class-action waivers 
in arbitration agreements). 
 16. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1752 (2011) (explaining that 
“[a]rbitration is poorly suited to the higher stakes of class litigation”). 
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because individual costs will be prohibitive.17 But in Concepcion, the 
Court held that a state law that operated to continuously render 
class arbitration waivers unconscionable was preempted by the 
FAA.18 While Concepcion certainly does not eradicate 
unconscionability as a viable defense,19 it does mean that class 
waivers are not per se unconscionable, particularly when coupled with 
the “arbitration-friendly” procedures present in AT&T’s arbitration 
clause (such as manufacturer-pays-all arbitration costs, the 
availability of double attorney’s fees, and a windfall to the prevailing 
plaintiff who recovers more than AT&T’s last settlement offer).20 
After Concepcion, courts continue to struggle with prohibitive-costs-
based defenses under the theory that prohibitive costs prevent 
vindication of statutory rights. But courts have no consensus on 
what factors should be analyzed under a “prohibitive costs” defense 
and to what such costs should be compared as a benchmark for 
determining whether they are truly prohibitive.21 
The Supreme Court’s decision in American Express has resolved a 
piece of the puzzle: an arbitration agreement with a class waiver will 
not be unenforceable under a “prohibitive costs” defense simply 
because without the class mechanism, the plaintiffs have no 
economic incentive to pursue their claims.22 The lower courts are 
now left to determine what is the measure of a litigant being 
deprived of his or her opportunity to vindicate statutory rights. Is it 
solely a matter of comparative costs? To what extent should 
attorneys’ fees be considered in the cost calculation?23 To what 
 
 17. See Lampley, supra note 14 at 490–99 (analyzing the historical defenses to 
arbitration). 
 18. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1753. 
 19. Id. at 1748. As the Court noted, Section 2’s “saving[s] clause preserves generally 
applicable contract defenses,” but nothing in it “suggests an intent to preserve state-law rules 
that stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the FAA’s objectives.” Id. 
 20. See id. at 1753 (describing the terms of AT&T’s “consumer friendly” agreement and 
citing the district court’s conclusion that the plaintiffs were “better off” in arbitration than as 
members of a class) (emphasis added). 
 21. See infra Part IV. 
 22. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2311 (2013) (“But the fact 
that it is not worth the expense involved in proving a statutory remedy does not constitute the 
elimination of the right to pursue that remedy.”). 
 23. See Christopher R. Drahozal, Arbitration Costs and Contingent Fee Contracts, 59 VAND. L. 
REV. 729, 768–70 (2006) (arguing that contingency fee agreements should be equally available 
to advance arbitration costs as they are to front litigation costs). The availability of contingency 
fee agreements with advanced costs, or lack thereof, has been a factor some courts have 
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extent do “incentivizing clauses” play a part? And does the litigant’s 
inability to hire a lawyer or expert for the potential sums recoverable 
individually mean that a court should find an agreement between 
two entities unenforceable? To what extent does the lack of 
incentives to bring a claim weigh in favor of not bringing the claim at 
all? This Article looks to the history of the cost-based defense and 
proposes to offer some answers to these questions. 
Part II of this Article outlines the history of the Federal 
Arbitration Act and the genesis of the “vindication of statutory 
rights” defense to arbitration based on prohibitive costs. Part III 
analyzes the courts’ different approaches to cost-based defenses and 
how those approaches have changed in light of the class arbitration 
waiver. Part IV argues that courts have traditionally employed either 
one or a hybrid of four different frameworks to assess prohibitive 
costs to arbitration. These approaches can be summarized as: (1) the 
subjective approach, which compares the costs of arbitration to the 
litigant’s ability to pay; (2) the comparative approach, which 
compares the costs of arbitration to proceeding in litigation; (3) the 
cost-benefit approach, which compares the costs of arbitration to the 
likelihood of the plaintiff’s potential recovery; and (4) the incentive-
based approach, which considers whether the plaintiffs or their 
potential attorneys have any incentive to pursue their claims, given the 
costs involved.24 Part V discusses the effect of American Express on 
the cost-based defense. Part VI then analyzes the textual sources for 
any given approach and ultimately concludes that the comparative 
approach, which compares the costs of arbitration to proceeding in 
litigation, is the only approach that is both grounded in the text of 
the Court’s vindication of statutory rights jurisprudence and serves 
the purposes of the FAA and enforcing statutory rights. Thus, any 
comparison based on lack of incentives (a policy based argument), a 
claimant’s ability to pay, or the likely costs of recovery, will yield 
decisions that are overly protective of the judicial forum. An 
otherwise binding arbitration agreement should only be invalidated 
on the basis that costs prevent a litigant from vindicating statutory 
rights when the litigant shows that the costs of proceeding in 
arbitration, as compared to litigation costs, are truly excessive. 
 
considered in considering the prohibitive costs of arbitration. See, e.g., Morrison v. Circuit City 
Stores, Inc., 317 F.3d 646, 664 (6th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (noting that due to the contingency fee 
arrangement, many litigants would face “minimal” costs in the judicial forum, while the litigant 
may have to pay the fees of the arbitrator in the arbitral forum). 
 24. See infra Part VI and notes 219–22. 
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II. THE FAA AND GENESIS OF THE VINDICATION OF STATUTORY RIGHTS 
DEFENSE 
The FAA declares that all “contract[s] evidencing a transaction 
involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy . . . shall 
be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as 
exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”25 As 
courts have echoed since its enactment in 1925, the FAA was passed 
“in response to widespread judicial hostility to arbitration 
agreements.”26 Thus, it reflects Congress’s “liberal federal policy 
favoring arbitration.”27 It requires that courts place “arbitration 
agreements on equal footing with all other contracts”28 and “enforce 
them according to their terms.”29 
Despite this backdrop, a quarter of a century after the FAA’s 
enactment, courts treated arbitration of federal claims with serious 
disdain. In the Supreme Court’s 1953 Wilko v. Swan decision, the 
Court refused to compel arbitration of a Securities Act claim on the 
basis that prospective waiver of the judicial forum was prohibited by 
Section 14 of the Securities Act, which rendered any waiver of 
compliance with its provisions void.30 The Securities Act had a 
 
 25. 9 U.S.C § 2 (2000). 
 26. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1745 (2011); see also Hall St. 
Assocs., LLC v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 581 (2008) (quoting Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. 
Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 443 (2006)). 
 27. Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp. 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983) 
(emphasis added); Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1745 (2011) (quoting Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 
24); see also, e.g., Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Bd. of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 
U.S. 468, 475 (1989); Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 62 (1995) 
(“[D]ue regard must be given to the federal policy favoring arbitration, and ambiguities as to the 
scope of the arbitration clause itself resolved in favor of arbitration.” (quoting Volt, 489 U.S. at 
476)). 
 28. Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 443 (2006); Concepcion, 131 
S. Ct. 1740, 1745 (2011). 
 29. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1745. See Volt, 489 U.S. at 475. 
 30. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 434–45 (1953), overruled by Rodriguez de Quijas v. 
Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. 490 U.S. 477 (1989). The Court reasoned that “the right to select 
the judicial forum is the kind of ‘provision’ that cannot be waived under §14 of the Securities 
Act.” Id. at 435. The petitioner’s claim in Wilko sounds much like the present-appellees’ claim 
protesting the arbitral forum in Amex III. For example, the petitioner argued that Congress 
intended “to assure that sellers (of Securities) could not maneuver buyers into a position that 
might weaken their ability to recover under the Securities Act. He contends that arbitration lacks 
the certainty of a suit at law under the Act to enforce his rights.” Id. at 432. Cf. Brief for 
Respondents at 54, Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2311 (2013) (No. 
12-133), 2013 WL 267025, at *54 (arguing that requiring the individual merchants to proceed in 
individual arbitration despite high expert costs “would be particularly troubling in the antitrust 
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unique provision granting the purchaser (to-be petitioner) with 
choice of venue, nation-wide service, and the waiver of any 
jurisdictional threshold requirement for diversity cases.31 In an 
exercise of judicial activism, the Court reasoned that the protections 
of the Securities Act “require . . . judicial direction to fairly assure 
their effectiveness”; thus, the right to judicial review, while not 
explicitly provided in the Act, could not be waived.32 
Wilko set the stage for sweeping court decisions, striking down 
any prospective arbitration agreement that the courts viewed as 
involving a claim “inappropriate” for arbitration.33 The circuit courts 
held unenforceable pre-dispute arbitration agreements involving a 
host of federal statutory provisions, including claimed violations of 
the Sherman Act, the Patent Act, the Railway Labor Act, the 
Employment Retirement Income Security Act, and employment 
claims under Title VII because the courts viewed the arbitral forum 
as unsuitable to hear such claims.34 
A. The Origin of the Vindication of Statutory Rights Doctrine 
A monumental sea change came with Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. 
Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,35 a case concerning whether a pre-
dispute arbitration agreement between two commercial entities 
 
context, where private enforcement serves important public functions”). See also Brief and 
Special Appendix for Plaintiffs-Appellants, In re Am. Express Merchs. Litig. at 17, 554 F.3d 300 
(2d Cir. 2009) (No. 06-1871-cv), 2006 WL 6198567 (“The American Express Card Acceptance 
Agreement for small merchants, with its collective action ban, flatly ensures that no small 
merchant may challenge American Express’s tying arrangements under the federal antitrust 
laws.”). 
 31. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 431. 
 32. Id. at 437 (emphasis added). 
 33. David Horton, Arbitration and Inalienability: A Critique of the Vindication of Rights 
Doctrine, 60 U. KAN. L. REV. 723, 730–31 (2012) (quoting Am. Safety Equip. Corp. v. J.P. 
Maguire & Co, 391 F.2d 821, 825 (2d Cir. 1968)). 
 34. See id. at 734–35 and accompanying notes (describing the history and breadth of the 
non-arbitrability doctrine and noting illustrative cases); see also Am. Safety, 391 F.2d at 825, 
overruled by Rodriguez, 490 U.S. 477 (1989) (holding that Sherman Act claims were inappropriate 
for arbitration); Hanes Corp. v. Millard, 531 F.2d 585, 593 (D.C. Cir. 1976), superceded in part by 
statute, 35 U.S.C. § 294 (2006), and overruled in part by Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahan, 
482 U.S. 220 (1987) (Patent Act claims inappropriate for arbitration); Air Line Pilots Ass’n, Int’l 
v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 627 F.2d 272, 277 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (Railway Labor Act claims not 
appropriate for arbitration); Barrowclough v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 752 F.2d 923, 939 (3d Cir. 
1985), overruled by Pritzker v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 7 F.3d 1110 (3d Cir. 
1993) (ERISA claims inappropriate for arbitration); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 
36, 59–60 (1974) (Title VII). 
 35. 473 U.S. 614 (1985). 
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could be enforced as to a federal antitrust claim brought by a 
domestic corporation against an international corporation.36 Despite 
prior precedent holding that antitrust claims were “inappropriate for 
enforcement by arbitration,”37 the district court held that the 
international character of the agreement (including arbitration) 
required enforcement even as to antitrust claims.38 The First Circuit 
reversed pursuant to the non-arbitrability doctrine, and the Supreme 
Court granted certiorari “primarily to consider whether an American 
court should enforce an agreement to resolve antitrust claims by 
arbitration when that agreement arises from an international 
transaction.”39 Notwithstanding its purported limitation to 
international arbitration agreements, the Mitsubishi decision would 
eventually set the stage for enforcement of pre-dispute arbitration of 
federal claims. 
 
 36. Mitsubishi Motors Corporation, a Japanese automobile manufacturer, entered into an 
agreement with Soler Chrysler-Plymouth that provided for the direct sales to Soler of Mitsubishi 
products and allowed Soler, a Chrysler dealer, to sell and market these Mitsubishi products in 
Puerto Rico. Id. at 617. The sales agreement also provided for mandatory arbitration of all 
disputes arising out of the agreement. Id. The arbitration was required to proceed in Japan 
pursuant to the rules of the Japan Commercial Arbitration Association. Id. Mitsubishi filed suit 
against Soler in the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico seeking to 
compel Soler to arbitrate its breach-of-contract claims pursuant to the Sales Agreement and the 
FAA. Id. Soler denied the allegations in Mitsubishi’s complaint, and counterclaimed against both 
Mitsubishi and its co-defendant, alleging various breach of contract claims by Mitsubishi, 
defamation claims, and statutory claims, including a cause of action under the Sherman Act, 15 
U.S.C. § 1 et seq. Id. at 620. 
 37. Id. at 621 (internal quotation marks omitted). The United States Court of Appeals for 
the Second Circuit had held that rights conferred under federal antitrust laws were “of a 
character inappropriate for enforcement by arbitration” in American Safety Equipment Corporation 
v. J.P. Maguire & Co, 391 F.2d at 827. The other circuits uniformly adopted this holding. See, e.g., 
Applied Digital Tech., Inc. v. Continental Cas. Co., 576 F.2d 116, 117 (7th Cir. 1978) (refusing 
to enforce arbitration agreement when antitrust issues permeate the case); Cobb v. Lewis, 488 
F.2d 41, 47 (5th Cir. 1974) (recognizing exception for post-dispute arbitration agreements); 
Helfenbein v. Int’l Indust. Inc., 438 F.2d 1068, 1070 (8th Cir. 1971); A & E Plastik Pak Co. v. 
Monsanto Co., 396 F.2d 710, 715–16 (9th Cir. 1968). Each of these cases prohibiting the 
arbitration of domestic antitrust claims was impliedly overturned by Mitsubishi and Rodriguez v. 
Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989) (reversing Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953), 
and holding that pre-dispute arbitration agreements covering claims arising under §14 of the 
Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77, are enforceable because “Wilko is pervaded by . . . ‘the old 
judicial hostility to arbitration.’” (quoting Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 
126 F.2d 978, 985 (2d Cir. 1942))). 
 38. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 621. The district court ordered the arbitration in reliance on 
Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 515–20 (1974), in which the Supreme Court ordered 
arbitration of a claim under the Securities Exchange Act of 1932 notwithstanding Wilko, due to 
the context of the international agreement. 
 39. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 624. 
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Before reaching the issue of the arbitrability of antitrust claims in 
the international context, the Mitsubishi Court addressed Defendant 
Soler’s contention that a court may not construe an arbitration 
agreement to reach statutory claims unless the party that the statute 
was designed to protect expressly agreed to arbitrate those statutory 
claims. Turning to the language of the FAA, the Court rejected this 
argument, finding “no warrant in the [FAA] for implying in every 
contract . . . a presumption against arbitration of statutory 
claims.”40 The Court reasoned that, “[A]s with any other contract, 
the parties’ intentions control, but those intentions are generously 
construed as to issues of arbitrability.”41 Ironically, nearly thirty 
years ago, the Mitsubishi Court expressed the aspirational sentiment 
that “we are well past the time when judicial suspicion of the 
desirability of arbitration and of the competence of arbitral tribunals 
inhibited the development of arbitration as an alternative means of 
dispute resolution.”42 Although the Court did not foreclose the idea 
that statutory claims may ever be excluded from the realm of 
arbitration, it did hold, in contravention of the non-arbitrability 
doctrine, that to exclude the statutory claim from the ambit of the 
FAA, Congressional intent must be evident.43 
 
 40. Id. at 625. Of course, the Court acknowledged that agreements to arbitrate may be 
revoked on the same grounds as those that would require the revocation of any contract, i.e. 
fraud, overwhelming economic power, etc., but it stated that “absent such compelling 
considerations, the [FAA] provides no basis for disfavoring agreements to arbitrate statutory 
claims by skewing the otherwise hospitable inquiry into arbitrability.” Id. at 627. 
 41. Id. at 626. 
 42. Id. 626–27. As the recent flurry of anti-arbitration litigation in the wake of the class 
waiver has shown, even thirty years past Mitsubishi and eighty years past the enactment of the 
FAA, we are not “well past the time” when suspicion of the desirability and competence of 
arbitration inhibits its use. See, e.g., AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1750 
(2011); In re Am. Exp. Merchs.’ Litig. (Amex III), 667 F.3d 204, 207 (2d Cir. 2012) (cert granted, 
133. S. Ct. 594 (2012)) and rev’d sub nom. Am. Exp. Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 
(2013)); Kilgore v. KeyBank, Nat’l Ass’n, 673 F.3d 947, 960 (9th Cir. 2012), (recognizing, in 
dicta, that “[i]t may be that enforcing arbitration agreements even when the plaintiff is 
requesting public injunctive relief will reduce the effectiveness of state laws like the UCL”). 
Amex III is a paradigm example. In this arbitration agreement between two businesses to 
prospectively arbitrate any disputes, the plaintiffs/small business owners claimed that to enforce 
the arbitration agreement would deprive them of vindicating their antitrust claims. This 
argument sounds a lot like those heard before and rejected in Mitsubishi. 
 43. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 627. The Court left itself some “wiggle” room. Couching its 
holding with the moderate disclaimer that it “is not to say that all controversies implicating 
statutory rights are suitable for arbitration.” Id. (emphasis added). This marks the beginning of 
the Court’s discomfort with a blanket proclamation that all statutory claims may be arbitrated, 
but reluctance to abrogate freedom of contract by delineating just what would make a statutory 
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The Court’s reasoning for the express-exclusion requirement 
provides the basis for modern-day “vindication of statutory rights” 
attacks on arbitration clauses: “[b]y agreeing to arbitrate a statutory 
claim, a party does not forgo the substantive rights afforded by the 
statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than 
a judicial, forum.”44 Because the protected party’s substantive rights 
under the statute are preserved and capable of vindication in the 
arbitral forum, the party has only “trad[ed] the procedures and 
opportunity for review of the courtroom for the simplicity, 
informality, and expedition of arbitration.”45 
Turning to the arbitrability of antitrust issues between a 
domestic party and an international party, the Court held that rules 
of international comity, the Arbitration Convention, and the 
presumption in favor of enforcing freely negotiated contractual 
choice of forum provisions outweighed judicial protectionism of 
antitrust claims cases.46 The Court reiterated that a party resisting 
arbitration may directly attack the arbitration clause if “enforcement 
would be unreasonable and unjust; or that proceedings in the 
contractual forum will be so gravely difficult and inconvenient that 
[the resisting party] will for all practical purposes be deprived of his 
day in court.”47 However, the Court left the legitimacy of the non-
arbitrability doctrine as applied in American Safety between domestic 
corporations intact.48 
 
claim unsuitable for arbitration. Of course, parties to the agreement could always draft an 
arbitration agreement excluding all or some statutory claims, such as antitrust claims. 
 44. Id. at 628. The Supreme Court characterized this portion of Mitsubishi’s holding as 
dicta in American Express. See infra note 208 and accompanying text. However, as discussed above, 
the effective vindication doctrine was a critical piece of the Mitsubishi Court’s holding that 
arbitration provided an equally suitable alternative forum. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at 632 (internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original). 
 48. Id. at 629. Regarding American Safety and the four ideals embraced by the First Circuit 
with skepticism, the Court found the second concern—the possibility that contracts which 
generate antitrust issues may be contracts of adhesion—unjustified. Id. at 632. With respect to 
the judicial retention rationale based on the complexity of the law and evidence, the Court 
adhered to the view that “adaptability and access to expertise are hallmarks of arbitration,” and 
the parties are free to take into account the complexity of the issue when appointing the 
arbitrators. Id. at 633. In addition, the Court noted, at the time of the contract the parties 
mutually preferred a procedure that would produce streamlined proceedings and expeditious 
results—a preference that would be well-served by reduced complexity. The Court also 
recognized that most lower courts following the American Safety doctrine were quite willing to 
enforce post-dispute agreements to arbitrate antitrust issues regardless of levels of complexity. 
Id. at 633–34. 
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The Court also rejected the proposition that an arbitration 
proceeding would pose innate hostility to the free-market ideal of 
competition: “We decline to indulge the presumption that the 
parties and arbitral body conducting a proceeding will be unable or 
unwilling to retain competent, conscientious, and impartial 
arbitrators.”49 Finally, the Court rejected the public policy 
suggestion that the importance of the private litigant to enforcement 
of antitrust laws (as opposed to the government alone) could justify 
removal of antitrust claims from the arbitral sphere. Although the 
clear import of the Sherman Act’s treble damages provision is to 
enable an injured competitor to gain remedial damages,50 the cause 
of action remains at all times under the control of the individual. No 
citizen is required to bring an antitrust suit; and no citizen is 
prohibited from settling an antitrust suit for less than full value.51 
Thus, a prospective litigant may provide in advance for a mutually 
agreeable procedure to settle his controversies, including his 
antitrust claims. The cornerstone of the Court’s theory was based on 
this premise: “[S]o long as the prospective litigant effectively may 
vindicate its statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum, the 
statute will continue to serve both its remedial and deterrent 
function.”52 Thus, in a case intended to cast arbitration, even of 
 
 49. Id. at 634. 
 50. The Court recounted the legislative history of § 4 of the Clayton Act which, when 
reenacted in 1914, “was still conceived primarily as open[ing] the door of justice to every man, 
whenever he may be injured by those who violate the antitrust laws, and giv[ing] the injured 
party ample damages for the wrong suffered.” Id. at 636 (quoting 51 Cong. Rec. 9073 (1914) 
(remarks of Rep. Webb)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (alterations in original). 
 51. These two observations by the Court in 1985 still ring true today. In American Express, 
the Department of Justice filed an amicus brief urging the Court to affirm the Second Circuit’s 
decision holding that the arbitration agreement prohibited vindication of statutory rights. As a 
basis for its interest in this matter, the Solicitor General stated:  
Private actions are an important supplement to the government’s civil enforcement 
efforts under federal competition laws, which the Department of Justice and the 
Federal Trade Commission have primary responsibility for administering . . . . The 
United States therefore has a substantial interest in ensuring that arbitration 
agreements are not used to prevent private parties from obtaining redress for 
violations of their federal statutory rights. 
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, Am. Express Co. v. 
Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 594 (2012), 2013 WL 367051 at *1–2. But despite the importance 
of private enforcement, no litigant is required to bring an antitrust claim, no matter how 
meritorious, and there is no requirement that any litigant see a claim through to final 
adjudication. 
 52. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 637 (emphasis added). The Court’s focus on the prospective 
litigant in this language should not be overlooked. So long as the parties, at the time of drafting 
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remedial statutes, on equal or more favorable footing as the judicial 
forum, the Court crafted language that would soon give rise to a 
method for invalidating arbitration agreements. 
B. Post-Mitsubishi: The Increasing Arbitrability of Federal Claims 
Mitsubishi laid the foundation for the Court’s sheltering of 
arbitration agreements. In the years after Mitsubishi, the Court held 
enforceable arbitration agreements as to claims based on various 
protective statutes such as § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934,53 the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act 
(RICO),54 § 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933,55 and the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA).56 Each time, the Court 
finessed the contours of the burgeoning vindication of statutory 
rights doctrine. In Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, the 
Court held that “[a]bsent a well-found claim that an arbitration 
agreement resulted from the sort of fraud or excessive economic 
power that ‘would provide grounds for the revocation of any 
contract[,]’ the Arbitration Act ‘provides no basis for disfavoring 
agreements to arbitration statutory claims by skewing the otherwise 
hospitable inquiry into arbitrability.’”57 Similarly, in Rodriguez de 
Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., the Court construed the FAA 
to permit courts to “give relief” from arbitration agreements “where 
the party opposing the arbitration presents ‘well-supported claims 
that the agreement to arbitrate resulted from the sort of fraud or 
overwhelming economic power that would provide grounds for the 
revocation of any contract.’”58 
 
the arbitration agreement, are not foreclosed of the opportunity to vindicate statutory rights by 
choosing the arbitral forum, the arbitration agreement should be upheld regardless of the 
parties’ changed circumstances in post-contractual litigation. Like an unconscionability analysis, 
the Court’s focus under a vindication of statutory rights analysis should be guided by the ex ante 
position of the parties. 
 53. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 238 (1987). 
 54. Id. 
 55. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 481 (1989). 
 56. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 28–29 (1991). 
 57. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 226 (quoting Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 627). Note the Court’s 
emphasis on a disparity of bargaining power here—i.e., a claim that sounds like a state law 
defense of unconscionability or even duress. This is a departure from the Court’s language in 
Mitsubishi that focused on whether the prospective litigant could vindicate statutory rights. 
 58. Rodriguez de Quijas, 490 U.S. at 483–84. But see id. at 481 (“The shift in the Court’s 
views on arbitration away from those adopted in Wilko is shown by the flat statement in 
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The next progression in the evolution of the “vindication of 
statutory rights” defense came in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane,59 
in which the Court enforced a pre-dispute arbitration agreement in 
an employment contract. The Gilmer plaintiff contended that claims 
arising under the ADEA were inappropriate for arbitration because 
the ADEA was designed to address important social policies in 
addition to individual grievances.60 After recognizing Mitsubishi’s 
holding that the arbitral forum is an equal, if not better, forum 
furthering broad social purposes, the Court reiterated: “[S]o long as 
the prospective litigant effectively may vindicate [his or her] 
statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum, the statute will 
continue to serve both its remedial and deterrent function.”61 
Perhaps in reaction to its dicta from earlier cases noted above, the 
Court admonished that “[m]ere inequality in bargaining power, 
however, is not a sufficient reason to hold that arbitration 
agreements are never enforceable in the employment context.”62 
Closely akin to the plaintiffs in Amex III, Gilmer argued that the 
arbitration procedures, which did not provide for class actions or 
broad equitable relief, could not adequately further the purposes of 
the ADEA.63 The Court disagreed that this procedural inconsistency 
rendered arbitration inconsistent with the ADEA, noting that 
arbitrators do have the power to fashion equitable relief and that the 
arbitration rules at issue also provided for collective proceedings.64 
Further, the Court recognized the possibility that the EEOC could 
still bring an administrative action seeking class-wide or equitable 
 
Mitsubishi: ‘By agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the substantive 
rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a 
judicial, forum.’”). 
 59. 500 U.S. at 28. 
 60. Id. at 27. 
 61. Id. (alterations in original) (citing Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 637). In contrast to 
Mitsubishi, which involved an agreement between two commercial organizations, Gilmer involved 
an agreement between an employee and employer. The Court found the distinction irrelevant. 
Id. at 33. The Court reminded “courts [to] remain attuned to well-supported claims that the 
agreement to arbitrate resulted from the sort of fraud or overwhelming economic power that 
would provide grounds for the revocation of any contract,” but found no such proof in this case. 
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 62. Id. For example, the Court noted: “Relationships between securities dealers and 
investors . . . may involve unequal bargaining power, but we nevertheless held in Rodriguez de 
Quijas and McMahon that agreements to arbitrate in that context are enforceable.” Id. 
 63. Id. at 32. 
 64. Id. 
DO NOT DELETE 1/27/2014 10:20 AM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2013 
840 
relief.65 “But,” the Court noted, “even if the arbitration could not go 
forward as a class action, or class relief could not be granted by the 
arbitrator, the fact that the [ADEA] provides for the possibility of 
bringing a collective action does not mean individual attempts at 
conciliation were intended to be barred.”66 Thus, the Court 
implicitly recognized that an employee still maintains the ability to 
effectively vindicate his or her statutory rights under the ADEA in 
the arbitral forum even if that forum results in the waiver of the 
opportunity to bring a class action. 
C. Use of “Vindication of Statutory Rights” as a Defense 
The prospective litigant’s ability to “effectively vindicate” statutory 
rights in both Mitsubishi and Gilmer was central to the Court’s holding 
that those pre-dispute arbitration agreements must be enforced. 
Although the Court raised the specter of unequal bargaining power as a 
potential defense in cases following Mitsubishi, that theory was 
effectively foreclosed in Gilmer’s recognition that unequal bargaining 
power alone was not enough to invalidate an enforceable arbitration 
agreement. Then in Green Tree Financial Corp.-Alabama v. Randolph67 the 
plaintiff argued that the “vindication of statutory rights” doctrine 
should be used as a defense to an arbitration agreement. Randolph 
presented the quintessential case of bargaining-power disparity. The 
plaintiff, a consumer-purchaser of a mobile home, financed the 
transaction through a financial services company.68 The merits of the 
plaintiff’s claim alleged that the defendant failed to disclose a finance 
charge in violation of the Truth in Lending Act (TILA).69 
 
 65. Id. at 33. 
 66. Id. at 32 (alteration in original). Any concerns about relinquishing class relief through 
binding arbitration were lessened by the Court’s recognition that arbitration agreements do not 
preclude the EEOC from bringing actions seeking class-wide and equitable relief. Id. As 
corporate use of the class waiver increases, we should see agencies such as the EEOC and state 
attorney generals increase public enforcement in the void left by class actions. See Myriam Gilles 
& Gary Friedman, supra note 12 at 660–65 (arguing that state attorney generals, through parens 
patriae authority, should “fill the void left by class actions”); see also Lampley, supra note 14 at 
517 (arguing that the deterrent effect typically served by class actions could be filled by state 
attorney generals or agency enforcement if class actions are diminished by the class waiver). 
 67. 531 U.S. 79 (2000). Plaintiff Randolph filed class claims under the TILA and Equal 
Credit Opportunity Acts, and Defendant Green Tree moved to compel arbitration pursuant to a 
binding arbitration agreement. Id. at 83. 
 68. Id. at 82. 
 69. Id. 
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The Randolph plaintiff argued that the arbitration agreement 
should be unenforceable because the agreement’s silence as to who 
would bear the costs of arbitration posed such a risk that she would 
be unable to enforce her statutory rights under the Truth in Lending 
Act.70 In a sentence that would reverberate thousands of times 
throughout the lower courts dealing with enforcement of arbitration 
clauses, the Court acknowledged: “It may well be that the existence 
of large arbitration costs could preclude a litigant such as Randolph 
from effectively vindicating her federal statutory rights in the arbitral 
forum.”71 But the plaintiff had not shown that she would bear such 
costs if the matter proceeded to arbitration.72 The Court held that 
Randolph’s “risk” of being “saddled with prohibitive costs [was] too 
speculative to justify the invalidation of an arbitration agreement.”73 
Randolph did two things that are critical to understanding the 
current state of a cost-based defense to arbitration: (1) it recognized 
the potential for invalidation of an arbitration agreement based on 
prohibitive costs, and (2) it placed that burden on the party seeking 
invalidation. But the Court refused to address the next logical 
question: what kind of showing of prohibitive expense must be met 
to justify a decision that arbitration is prohibitively expensive?74 The 
sub-inquiries are numerous. What kinds of costs are properly 
considered as arbitration costs? Do they include costs that would be 
inherently bound up in litigation, such as expert fees or costs of 
discovery? How should the burden of proof be met, by affidavit or 
preliminary hearing? And how much discovery and briefing should 
be permitted on this issue? This final question poses a danger of 
swallowing the entire proceeding in extensive discovery in what 
should be a relatively simple exercise to enforce, or not enforce, an 
arbitration agreement. The result we see in American Express, in 
which the parties have been tied up in Court nine years simply on 
the arbitration issue, is not in accord with the intent of the FAA or 
 
 70. Neither party disputed the arbitration clause’s applicability to all claims, even 
statutory claims, arising under the contract, and Ms. Randolph did not contend that the TILA 
evinces a clear intention by Congress to preclude waiver of judicial (or class) remedies. Id. at 90. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at 91. 
 74. Id. at 92 (“How detailed the showing of prohibitive expense must be before the party 
seeking arbitration must come forward with contrary evidence is a matter we need not discuss; 
for in this case neither during discovery nor when the case was presented on the merits was 
there any timely showing at all on the point.”). 
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the intended implications of Randolph. By leaving this question open, 
the Court caused parties to arbitration agreements to have uneven 
application and uncertainty in the law. 
But there are some buried guideposts in the footnoted dicta of 
Randolph. In rather lengthy footnote six, the Court recounts the 
record evidence on which the plaintiff relied to show prohibitive 
costs. In her motion to reconsider before the trial court, the plaintiff 
acknowledged that the arbitration agreement was silent as to 
selection of arbitral forum or arbitrator.75 Thus, the plaintiff 
“assumed” the filing would be with the American Arbitration 
Association (AAA).76 The plaintiff also assumed the filing fee for 
claims under $10,000 was $500, which did not include the costs of 
the arbitrator or administration fees.77 The plaintiff also cited an 
article published by the Bureau of National Affairs, entitled Labor 
Lawyers at ABA Session Debate Role of American Arbitration Association, in 
which an AAA executive noted that the average arbitral fee is $700 
per day.78 The Court gave these assumptions no credence, as the 
plaintiff had made no showing that her arbitration would proceed in 
the AAA, or that if it did, that she would actually incur those charges 
referenced.79 The Court declined to address the plaintiff’s contention 
that the arbitration agreement was unenforceable because it 
prevented her from bringing her TILA claims as a class action.80 The 
arbitration agreement was silent as to the availability of class claims. 
 
 75. Of course, it is curious that the negative implication of this drafting error resulted in 
construal against the plaintiff, who had no arm’s length negotiation as to its terms. 
 76. Id. at 90 n.6. 
 77. Id. But the plaintiff submitted no proof of these fees. Although she attached 
“informational material from the American Arbitration Association (AAA),” it did not discuss 
fees. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at n.7. The Court also did not address the underlying question of whether the 
vindication of statutory rights issue is a question of arbitrability reserved for a court to 
determine or whether it is a matter for the arbitrator to decide. On the one hand, if the existence 
of prohibitive arbitration costs did actually deprive a plaintiff of her opportunity to effectively 
vindicate statutory rights, the arbitration agreement would be unenforceable, and hence, a 
question for the court to decide in the first instance. See Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. 
Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 445–46 (2006). On the other hand, if the crux of the vindication of 
statutory rights argument is based on an interpretation of the procedures and penalties available 
in the arbitration procedures, such as limits on discovery, costs, and damages, the question 
should be for the arbitrator to decide. See Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 452 
(2003) (holding that the arbitrator should decide procedural gateway matters, such as whether 
an arbitration clause permits a class action). 
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Thus, Randolph turned what had been a measure of equal 
vindication of federal claims in the arbitral forum into a possible 
defense to arbitration, if the contesting party could prove that the 
arbitral forum was so expensive as to deprive the prospective litigant 
of the opportunity to vindicate statutory rights. 
 III. CONCEPCION AND ITS INFLUENCE ON THE VINDICATION OF 
STATUTORY RIGHTS DOCTRINE 
For the next twelve years the Court remained silent as to how to 
treat a vindication of statutory rights defense. Due to the federal 
policy favoring arbitration agreements and the attractiveness of more 
streamlined, potentially cost-effective dispute resolution, employers, 
manufacturers, and finance companies adopted pre-dispute 
arbitration agreements with some fervor.81 These pre-dispute 
arbitration clauses also evolved to include a binding agreement to 
proceed in individual arbitration, waiving any procedural right to 
participate in a class proceeding or as a class representative.82 
Arbitration agreements with class waivers were met with two 
veins of defenses: state law defenses based on unconscionability and 
a defense based on the vindication of statutory rights doctrine.83 
Courts struggled with the application of these doctrines for years 
with little guidance on the enforceability of arbitration agreements 
that waive a right to proceed as a class representative. But the Court 
did resolve a number of procedural issues implicating the viability of 
the class-action/arbitration waiver. In Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. 
Cardegna, the Court held that questions as to the validity of the 
contract as a whole were for the arbitrator to decide, while questions 
 
 81. See Gilles, supra note 14, at 394–98; Stempel, supra note 14, at 398 (“The practical 
consequences of the new legal era were significant. Arbitration left the province of particular 
business guilds or commercial environments and shifted to a massive privatization of the 
adjudicatory function. . . . [A] genre of new arbitration arose, in which arbitration agreements 
were essentially imposed upon a large, general class of consumers and workers.”); see also 
Lampley, supra note 14, at 503–13 (providing a detailed overview of the evolution of arbitration 
agreements in consumer product sales from first-generation agreements to third-generation 
incentivizing agreements). 
 82. See Christopher R. Drahozal & Samantha Zyontz, Private Regulation of Consumer 
Arbitration, 79 TENN. L. REV. 289, 347–49 (2012) (finding class arbitration waivers in 36.5% of 
consumer arbitration agreements giving rise to AAA arbitrations in 2007, and 100% use of the 
class waiver in consumer agreements involving cell phones and credit cards in the 2007 AAA 
sample). 
 83. See supra note 17. 
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as to the validity of the arbitration clause remained within the 
province of the court.84 Then, in Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds 
International Corp., the Court held that it may not be inferred (by an 
arbitrator or a court) that the parties agreed to class-wide arbitration 
from an agreement’s silence.85 Thus, parties could not be compelled 
to participate in class-wide arbitration absent a contractual basis for 
finding that the parties agreed to do so.86 The Court’s holding in 
Stolt-Nielsen was founded on the recognition that “class-action 
arbitration changes the nature of arbitration to such a degree that it 
cannot be presumed the parties consented to it by simply agreeing to 
submit their disputes to an arbitrator.”87 The Court observed that in 
arbitration, parties forgo the judicial rigor and appellate review of the 
courts for lower costs, greater efficiency and speed, and the ability to 
choose expert adjudicators to resolve specialized disputes.88 In class 
arbitration, the arbitrator no longer resolves a single dispute 
between the parties, but instead resolves disputes between hundreds 
or even thousands of parties.89 This drastically raises the stakes of 
commercial class arbitration, while the scope of judicial review 
remains limited. Given the vast ramifications posed by class 
arbitration, it is too great to presume consent to class-wide 
arbitration based on silence.90 
Then in AT&T Mobility, LLC v. Concepcion, the Court addressed 
whether a state-law rule (California’s) that declared unconscionable 
 
 84. 546 U.S. 440, 445–46 (2006). Buckeye extended the separability doctrine first 
established in Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967) to 
state courts. STEPHEN J. WARE, PRINCIPLES OF ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION § 2.20 (2d ed. 
2007). Although Buckeye said nothing about the enforcement of class waivers per se, it does have 
important implications on the question of who should decide whether the arbitration clause is 
enforceable—the court or the arbitrator? If the question as to validity, whether under an 
unconscionability or vindication of statutory rights defense, is solely raised against the 
arbitration clause, then the issue should be for the court to decide. 
 85. 559 U.S. 662, 684 (2010). Stolt-Nielsen also left open the question of who should 
decide the issues regarding the scope of the arbitration clause as it pertains to class proceedings. 
Id. at 679 (noting that the parties assumed the arbitrator must decide whether the arbitration 
clause permitted class proceedings, but that had never been decided by a majority of the Court). 
 86. Id. at 684. 
 87. Id. at 685. 
 88. Id. at 685–86. Note the implications of this last provision on Amex III. Why should 
expert costs be as great in arbitration as in litigation, when the theoretical ideal is that 
arbitration is more streamlined, more cost-efficient? Indeed, that is presumably one of the 
reasons the parties agreed to opt out of litigation in the pre-dispute arbitration agreement. 
 89. Id. at 686. See also AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1750 (2011). 
 90. Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U.S. at 686–87. 
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any consumer arbitration agreement in an “adhesion contract” in 
disputes that involved small amounts of damages, when it was 
alleged that the party with superior bargaining power had carried out 
a scheme to cheat consumers out of individual small amounts of 
money, is preempted by the FAA.91 Although Concepcion did not 
involve and arguably did not speak to a vindication of statutory 
rights defense, the application of California’s Discover Bank rule was 
quite similar to a vindication of statutory rights analysis.92 In sum, if 
consumers could not vindicate low-dollar claims due to their arbitral 
consent to forgo the class action, the arbitration agreement would be 
unconscionable and unenforceable under state law. 
The Court held that California’s Discover Bank rule is preempted 
by the FAA because it “interferes with fundamental attributes of 
arbitration.”93 Allowing a party to demand class arbitration after a 
dispute arises thwarts the purpose of arbitration by involving 
significantly higher stakes, necessitating additional and different 
procedures, and requiring the complex decision of class-
certification.94 The Court acknowledged the public policy arguments 
raised by the plaintiffs in favor of permitting class arbitration of such 
low-dollar claims. First, the Discover Bank rule was limited to 
“adhesion contracts.” But, as the Court noted, “the times in which 
consumer contracts were anything other than adhesive are long 
past.”95 Another component of the Discover Bank rule was that 
“damages be predictably small.”96 As the Court observed, this 
requirement is malleable—small compared to what measure?97 
Indeed, the Ninth Circuit had held that damages as high as $4,000 
were sufficiently small to justify invalidation of an arbitration 
agreement under the Discover Bank rule.98 And the requirement that 
the consumer “allege a scheme to cheat consumers” was of no 
 
 91. California’s rule, known as the Discover Bank rule, operated to render unconscionable, 
and therefore, unenforceable, almost all consumer arbitration agreements with class waivers. See 
Lampley, supra note 14, at 491–92. 
 92. See Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2312 (2013) (stating that 
Concepcion “all but resolves this case” because Concepcion rejected the argument that class 
arbitration was necessary to prosecute low value claims). 
 93. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1748. 
 94. Id. at 1750. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. (citing Oestreicher v. Alienware Corp., 322 F. App’x 489, 492 (9th Cir. 2009)). 
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limiting effect, as that allegation was present in every opposition to a 
motion to enforce class action/arbitration claims involving 
consumers.99 
Finally, the Court responded to the most important argument for 
“vindication of statutory rights” purposes—the public policy 
argument that class proceedings are simply necessary to prosecute 
“small-dollar claims” that otherwise may go unprosecuted.100 But, 
under the FAA preemption doctrine, states cannot require a 
procedure (here, a class procedure) inconsistent with the FAA’s 
purposes “even if it is desirable for unrelated reasons.”101 Further, 
under AT&T’s incentivizing agreement, the Court noted that it was 
“unlikely” that the claim go unresolved on even an individual 
basis.102 AT&T, in a third-generation consumer friendly agreement, 
provided that it would pay all costs of arbitration for non-frivolous 
claims and provided an incentive compensation of minimum 
damages of $7,500 and double attorneys’ fees if the 
consumer/plaintiffs obtained an arbitration award greater than 
AT&T’s last settlement offer.103 Thus, the Court rejected the 
“incentive-based” public policy argument for rendering arbitration 
agreements unconscionable under a state-law defense, but this 
holding did not necessarily control the applicability of such an 
argument to a cost-based defense under a vindication of statutory 
rights theory. 
IV. COSTS IN THE VINDICATION OF STATUTORY RIGHTS ANALYSIS POST-
RANDOLPH 
Since the Randolph Court’s intentional invitation to the lower 
courts to develop exactly what and how much expense is 
“prohibitive” to vindicating one’s statutory rights in the arbitral 
 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. at 1753. 
 101. Id. This, of course, leaves open the field of a federal vindication of statutory rights 
defense that would not be hampered by FAA preemption doctrine. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. The district court actually found that the plaintiffs were better off under the 
arbitration agreement than they would have been as class claimants, which could take months or 
years to resolve and for which the potential recovery may yield only a small percentage of a few 
dollars. Id. I have examined the potential economic benefits to consumers under this type of 
incentivizing agreement elsewhere. See Lampley, supra note 14, at 512–17. 
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forum,104 courts have floundered with what costs to include, and 
what measure to balance the costs against. As this Article discusses 
below, the different approaches can be summarized as (1) the 
subjective approach, which compares the costs of arbitration to the 
litigant’s ability to pay; (2) the comparative approach, which 
compares the costs of arbitration to the costs of proceeding in 
litigation; (3) the cost/benefit approach, which compares the costs of 
arbitration to the likelihood of the plaintiff’s potential recovery; and 
(4) the incentive-based approach, which considers whether the 
plaintiffs or their potential attorneys have any incentive, given the 
costs involved, to pursue their claims. 
Similarly, parties wishing to enforce arbitration agreements have 
“evolved” such agreements so as to make them impenetrable to both 
vindication of statutory rights and unconscionability defenses. Thus, 
arbitration agreements evolved from “first generation” agreements 
that were one-sided and posed the potential for large fees to the 
signatory party to “third generation” consumer-friendly arbitration 
agreements, like the one at issue in Concepcion.105 
A. Application of “Excessive Costs” 
Surprisingly, in what is the most important case to reach the 
Court regarding proper application of the vindication of statutory 
rights doctrine, American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, the 
parties spent little argument on the paradigm through which 
excessive costs should be assessed.106 Judge Jacobs criticized the 
 
 104. Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Alabama v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 92 (2000) (“How detailed 
the showing of prohibitive expense must be before the party seeking arbitration must come 
forward with contrary evidence is a matter we need not discuss; for in this case neither during 
discovery nor when the case was presented on the merits was there any timely showing at all on 
the point.”). 
 105. Gilles, supra note 12, at 846–51 (providing an overview of the evolution of binding 
arbitration agreements but finding that few companies have offered terms as generous as those 
at issue in Concepcion); Lampley, supra note 14, at 503–13 (providing an overview of the evolution 
of arbitration agreements in consumer product sales from first-generation agreements to third-
generation incentivizing agreements). 
 106.  See for Brief for Petitioners at 44, Am. Express Co., 133 S. Ct. 594 (No. 12-133), 2012 
WL 6755152 (“But Randolph’s reference to ‘large arbitration costs’ does not support the Second 
Circuit’s decision in this case because it was not a reference to any and all costs, whether in 
arbitration or litigation. It referred to filing fees, arbitrator’s fees, and other administrative fees 
imposed by the arbitral forum that would not be required to sue in court.); Brief for 
Respondents at 21, Am. Express Co., 133 S. Ct. 594 (No. 12-133), 2013 WL 267025, at *44 
(“Specifically, the [Randolph] Court envisioned a claimant making a particularized showing that 
the costs of arbitrating under the agreement would be ‘prohibitive,’ i.e., exceed the maximum 
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Second Circuit’s denial of petition for rehearing en banc because the 
“large arbitration costs” relied on by the Second Circuit to invalidate 
the arbitration agreement under Randolph were not the type of 
“costs” properly considered under a Randolph analysis.107 Indeed, 
Judge Jacobs urged that any Randolph prohibitive costs analysis must 
be limited to the “cost of access to the arbitral forum” and the price 
of admission.108 For example, Judge Jacobs identified payment of 
filing fees, arbitration costs, and other arbitration expenses as 
properly considered “costs.”109 What is not a proper consideration 
according to the dissenting panel were expenses that would also be 
incurred in litigation, namely, expert fees.110 Little attention has 
been given to the topic, and courts approach the issue with a lack of 
any consensus.111 Surprisingly, even the Supreme Court skirted this 
issue in deciding American Express. While the majority of the Court 
agreed that high expert fees as compared to recoverable damages 
would not justify invalidating an arbitration agreement under an 
“effective vindication” rubric, the Court did not include any 
reasoning as to why such costs are different from the true arbitration 
costs that could and should be considered under a cost-based 
defense.112 
In the first reported case to assess prohibitive costs following 
Randolph, In re Managed Care Litigation, the trial court adopted a loose 
balancing approach by examining the plaintiff-subscriber’s filing fees 
of $250 against the plaintiff’s claimed damages.113 Without 
 
potential recovery.”). 
 107. In re Am. Exp. Merchs.’ Litig., 681 F.3d 139, 147 (2d Cir. 2012) (Jacobs J., 
dissenting), denial of petition for rehearing en banc. Judge Jacobs’s dissent was joined by Judges 
Cabranes and Livingston. 
 108. Id. (Jacobs, J., dissenting). 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. David Horton provides an overview of post-Randolph treatment of vindication of 
rights challenges in his article Arbitration and Inalienability: A Critique of the Vindication of Rights 
Doctrine, 60 U. KAN. L. REV. 723, 736–41 (2012). Horton argues that courts should link the 
intensity of judicial review to the specific federal statute at issue. Id. at 750. 
 112.  Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2310–11 (2013). 
 113. 132 F. Supp. 2d 989, 999 (S.D. Fla. 2000) modified on other grounds, 143 F. Supp. 2d 
1371 (S.D. Fla. 2001) and aff’d by In re Humana Inc. Managed Care Litig., 285 F.3d 971 (11th 
Cir. 2002) rev’d on other grounds by PacifiCare Health Sys. Inc. v. Book, 538 U.S. 401 (2003). 
Although the district court minimally addressed the prohibitive cost argument raised by the 
consumer-plaintiff, the court declined to even recognize that the physician-plaintiffs could 
sustain a “prohibitive costs” argument based on Randolph presumably due to their assumed 
socio-economic status: “In total, the doctors are sophisticated individuals, not consumers 
alleging TILA violations in connection with the purchase of a mobile home or employees suing 
under Title VII.” Id. The decision in In re Managed Care eventually led to the Supreme Court’s 
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discussing the potential recovery, the district court found that the 
plaintiff’s “amount in controversy” was not such a “small sum” to 
find that the plaintiff had met her burden of showing prohibitive 
costs to vindication of statutory rights.114 Given the Court’s only 
indication of what costs should be considered in Randolph’s footnote 
six, this filing fee versus recovery analysis was no large stretch, but it 
still lacked any basis in precedence or application. 
But courts struggled with the prohibitive cost analysis. In one of 
the few cases to thoroughly consider which factors should bear 
weight in the analysis, Bradford v. Rockwell Semiconductor Systems, 
Inc.,115 the Fourth Circuit rejected adoption of a per se rule that 
would render unenforceable any employment pre-dispute arbitration 
agreement that required fee-splitting of the arbitration costs. Instead 
the court held that Gilmer and Randolph require a case-by-case 
assessment of whether arbitration costs in the plaintiff’s particular 
situation will deprive him of vindicating statutory rights in the 
arbitral forum.116 The appropriate factors to weigh in this case-by-
case analysis, according to the Bradford court, are (1) “the claimant’s 
ability to pay the arbitration fees and costs,” (2) “the expected cost 
differential between arbitration and litigation in court,” and (3) 
“whether that cost differential is so substantial as to deter the 
bringing of claims.”117 
Bradford was not the best case in which to launch a cost-based 
defense because the plaintiff had already pursued arbitration of his 
ADEA claims and lost, which cast his claim that he could not afford 
the arbitral forum in a suspicious light.118 The court held that under 
the three factors identified above, the plaintiff had not carried his 
 
decision in PacifiCare, 538 U.S. at 406–07, in which the Court held that the applicability of a 
waiver of punitive damages clause in an arbitration agreement to treble damages available under 
RICO was an issue for the arbitrator to decide, and thus could not form the cornerstone of the 
plaintiff’s “prohibitive costs” argument. 
 114. In re Managed Care Litig., 132 F. Supp. 2d at 999. 
 115. 238 F.3d 549, 556 (4th Cir. 2001). 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. While this inquiry may have some basis in Randolph, it is not without problems. 
Should the enforcement of a pre-dispute arbitration agreement be dependent on the individual 
socio-economic status of a plaintiff? At what point in time? If a plaintiff is well-off at the time he 
agrees to arbitration and his financial condition changes, should that be a factor? Given the 
Court’s emphasis on the prospective litigant’s waiver of rights, it suggests that the plaintiff’s 
ability to afford arbitration should be viewed at the time the agreement was entered into. 
 118. Id. at 558 n.7 (“It therefore makes sense that the individual who claims to be 
financially burdened by the fee-splitting provision should raise his objections to the fee-splitting 
arrangement, including a specific forecast of his expected costs and his expected financial 
burden, prior to the beginning of arbitration.”) (emphasis added). 
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burden of showing that the fee-splitting provision rendered 
arbitration too expensive for him to vindicate statutory rights under 
the ADEA.119 Although the plaintiff offered evidence that he was 
billed $4,470.88 for his arbitration, the court held that this cost was 
not insurmountable in light of his $115,000 base salary and 
approximate $50,000 annual bonus.120 The court also noted that 
under the plaintiff’s arbitration agreement, he would have been 
entitled to attorneys’ fees had he prevailed.121 But the plaintiff failed 
to offer any evidence of the comparative cost of litigation or the 
hardship he suffered by being confined to his pre-dispute contractual 
choice.122 
This last factor clearly played a weighty force. The court 
commented that arbitral costs can not be “measured in a vacuum” or 
measured upon a conclusory statement that costs are “too high.”123 
Instead, the analysis “must focus upon a claimant’s expected or 
actual arbitration costs and his ability to pay those costs, measured 
against a baseline of the claimant’s expected costs for litigation and his ability 
to pay those costs.”124 
The Bradford factors met with approval in many courts.125 But in 
a marked twist on the individualized assessment of Bradford, the 
 
 119. Id. at 558–59. 
 120. Id. at 558 n.6. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. at 558 n.5. 
 124. Id. (emphasis added). 
 125. See, e.g., Musnick v. King Motor Co. of Fort Lauderdale, 325 F.3d 1255, 1257–60 (11th 
Cir. 2003) (citing Bradford factors with approval and holding that the party opposing arbitration 
has “an obligation to offer evidence of the amount of fees he is likely to incur, as well as of his 
inability to pay those fees”); Livingston v. Assocs. Fin., Inc., 339 F.3d 553, 557 (7th Cir. 2003) 
(requiring party opposing arbitration to provide “individualized evidence that it likely will face 
prohibitive costs in the arbitration at issue and that it is financially incapable of meeting those 
costs”); Blair v. Scott Specialty Gases, 283 F.3d 595, 609–10 (3d Cir. 2002) (citing Bradford 
factors with approval and remanding for discovery as to actual costs of AAA arbitration in 
relation to the plaintiff’s ability to pay); Boyd v. Hayneville, 144 F. Supp. 2d 1272, 1280 (M.D. 
Ala. 2001) (finding the plaintiff’s allegations of prohibitive costs too speculative when the 
plaintiff presented evidence of his own financial position, in which he earned $2,078 of income 
per month, nearly all of which was by consumer household expenses, and a range of AAA 
arbitrator fees based on which he estimated his costs for the arbitration would range from 
$1,150 and $6,400). Despite this evidence of his personal financial status and an estimate of 
potential arbitration costs, the court held the evidence too “speculative” in light of the AAA’s 
provision permitting reduction of costs due to financial hardship. Boyd, 1144 F. Supp. at 1280. 
There was no way to predict what the actual costs might have been. Id. Like the Bradford court, 
the Boyd court relied on the lack of comparative evidence as to the cost of litigation as a “highly 
relevant” basis for finding the plaintiff had not met his burden of proof. Id. at 1280 n.5 (citation 
omitted). 
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Sixth Circuit held in Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc.126 that a 
claimant seeking to evade enforcement of an arbitration agreement 
could do so if he proves that the “potential costs of arbitration” are 
large enough to deter him and “similarly situated individuals” from 
seeking to vindicate their statutory rights.127 
Under this rubric, the Morrison court instructed that the 
reviewing court should “define the class of such similarly situated 
potential litigants by job description and socioeconomic 
background.”128 While the court should take note of the individual 
plaintiff’s income and resources, a detailed inquiry into the 
household budgets of various employees would not be required.129 
Further, the court should determine “average or typical arbitration 
costs” because that is the information potential litigants would seek 
in making a decision to pursue statutory claims.130 The Morrison 
court agreed with Bradford that there must be a comparative analysis 
of the costs of litigation as compared to arbitration, but admonished 
that these cases must be weighed in a realistic manner—presumably 
because most plaintiffs in discrimination cases are represented by 
attorneys on a contingency fee basis.131 Finally, the court should 
 
 126. 317 F.3d 646, 658–65 (6th Cir. 2003) (en banc). The court first rejected the 
suggestion by the defendant and other courts that any cost-based defense of arbitration should 
be assessed after the arbitration has taken place. As the court correctly noted, this post hoc review 
of actual costs is riddled with problems: judicial review of arbitral rewards is narrow; the 
plaintiff who is likely to be deterred by excessive costs will not bring the proceeding at all; and as 
the Bradford court reasoned, once a plaintiff has already availed himself of an arbitral forum, an 
argument that the forum deprived him of effectively vindicating statutory rights is hardly 
persuasive. Id. at 660–61. 
 127. Id. at 663 (emphasis added). The court grounded this stretch of Randolph’s prohibitive 
costs defense on Gilmer’s recognition that federal anti-discrimination statutes play both a 
remedial and a deterrent role. Thus, to protect the statutory rights at issue, the court held that a 
reviewing court must consider not only the arbitration’s chilling effect on the plaintiff at issue, 
but whether similarly situated plaintiffs would be less likely to bring such claims, thereby 
lessening any deterrent effect. Id. 
 128. Id. For employers who use binding arbitration agreements across employee classes, 
such an undertaking may prove unwieldy with impractical results. As applied to a different class 
of plaintiffs, consumers, for example, the result lacks basis—should a wealthy purchaser of a cell 
phone be required to arbitrate claims whereas the indigent purchaser should not? 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. at 664. Note that a factor not delineated by Morrison is an assessment of likelihood 
to succeed on the merits—which is something that every rational potential litigant would 
consider if faced with fronting a portion of costs himself. 
 131. Id. at 664. But what precludes an attorney from pursuing arbitration on a contingency 
fee basis? See Christopher R. Drahozal, Arbitration Costs and Contingent Fee Contracts, 59 VAND. L. 
REV. 729, 770 (2006) (“Arbitration costs do not severely restrict, or eliminate, the advantage a 
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“discount” the possibility that the plaintiff will not be required to 
pay costs of fees due to success on the merits.132 Under Morrison’s 
“similarly situated” subjective test, the court conceded that 
arbitration agreements against high-level managerial employees 
would likely be enforceable, whereas for lower-level employees, the 
costs would mean the arbitral forum has a “chilling effect” on 
vindication of statutory rights.133 
The application of Morrison to the facts of the case was 
illuminating. The court held plaintiff Morrison’s arbitration 
agreement was not enforceable because it would deter a number of 
similarly situated employees from enforcing their statutory rights.134 
Under the plaintiff’s arbitration agreement, her responsibility for 
arbitration fees and costs would be capped at the greater of $500 or 
three percent of her annual salary—a provision that seemingly would 
be arbitration “friendly.”135 Nonetheless, the court held that these 
fee-caps must be considered from the vantage point of the recently 
terminated potential litigant who faces bills for other necessities and 
a probable brief period of unemployment.136 “Turning to the 
arbitration agreement . . . the potential litigant finds that, as the 
default rule, she will be obligated to pay half the costs of any 
arbitration which she initiates.”137 Based on “minimal research,” the 
potential plaintiff would discover that arbitrating the dispute could 
reach thousands, if not tens of thousands of dollars.138 Faced with 
the choice of “risking one’s scarce resources in the hopes of 
uncertain benefit,” the court held that a substantial number of 
 
consumer has under the contingency fee system. Instead, the contingent fee system provides a 
mechanism for overcoming possible liquidity and risk aversion constraints due to arbitration 
costs.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). As the court came to recognize, the most significant 
expense to be considered will likely be the arbitrator’s fees and costs, which are not incurred in a 
judicial forum. 
 132. Morrison, 317 F.3d at 664. This cost-shifting provision may be by agreement or due to 
federal law. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. at 669. 
 135. Id. In the plaintiff’s case, her fees would have been capped at $1,622. 
 136.  Id. 
 137. Id. Why the Sixth Circuit adopted the view that the potential litigant would give more 
credence to a 50 percent splitting provision than the provision limiting fees to $500 or three 
percent of the employee’s salary if arranged within ninety days of the award is never explained. Id. 
 138. Id. The court based this estimation on a report by Public Citizen, a consumer-
advocacy organization, which, as the dissent points out, was marshaling evidence to show why 
cost-splitting provisions are a “bad idea.” Id. at 669, 684. 
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similarly situated persons would be deterred from seeking to 
vindicate statutory rights.139 What the court did not assess was the 
proven arbitration costs as compared to the potential recovery.140 
Given the application of the fee cap, Morrison herself would face a 
maximum fee of $1,622 to pursue her claim—provided she arranged 
payment within ninety days of an award. Yet even under the limited 
damages agreement drafted by Circuit City, Morrison stood to collect 
$462,000 in damages if she prevailed.141 
Similarly, in Plaintiff Shankle’s case,142 the court held the 
arbitration agreement unenforceable when it required the plaintiff to 
pay one-half of the arbitrator’s fees. Relying on information about 
the “typical employment discrimination arbitration,” the appellate 
court found that the arbitration in this case would cost between 
$2,250 and $6,000.143 The plaintiff was employed by the defendant 
as a mechanic and a sales person. In direct contradiction to its earlier 
holding, the court held: “Even without a searching inquiry into 
Shankle’s income and overall financial situation, we conclude that 
such a provision would deter a substantial number of similarly 
situated potential litigants from seeking to vindicate their statutory 
rights . . . .”144 The court rejected the defendant’s post-dispute 
offer to pay Shankle’s share of the arbitration fee.145 These two 
 
 139.  Id. at 670. 
 140. Even the Public Citizen report on which the court relied estimated costs from $4,350 
to $11,625 for pursuing an $80,000 claim. Id. at 669. Thus, it seems that arbitral costs bear some 
relation to the amount of damages, as one would expect. 
 141. If the limitations of damages provisions were severed from the contract, as they were 
in this case, the plaintiff stood to recover even more than $462,000. Under a pure comparative 
approach in which the costs of arbitration are compared to litigation, the potential recovery in 
damages likely has no proper bearing unless the arbitration agreement greatly limits damages. 
But it is curious in a case that is primarily based on a litigant’s subjective ability to pay (as a 
member of a quasi-class), that no weight at all is given to the litigant’s potential recovery. 
 142. Shankle was an employee of Pep Boys facing a binding pre-dispute arbitration 
agreement. This case was consolidated with Morrison for purposes of appeal on the prohibitive 
costs issue. Id. at 656. 
 143. Id. at 676. This raises the issue of what is the proper role for an appellate court in 
assessing facts in a preliminary prohibitive costs defense to a motion to compel arbitration. Are 
averages enough, or should the plaintiff be held to prove what his individual arbitration is likely 
to cost? If the latter, the obstacles to proof are real. How can one ever truly know, before going 
through the filing fee and arbitrator selection process (and any negotiations regarding fee 
waivers), precisely how much arbitral fees will be? 
 144. Id. 
 145. Since Morrison and cases like it, drafters of arbitration agreements are well-advised to 
offer to pay the arbitration fees, or at least a substantial portion of them, if they know the claims 
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applications show that the Morrison court was primarily concerned 
with two factors: (1) the party opposing arbitration’s ability to pay 
(the subjective approach) and (2) a concern about the broad social 
purposes of private enforcement of federal statutory rights. This last 
factor is a concern that would play heavily in light of the class 
waiver. 
B. Analysis of Prohibitive Costs in Light of a Class Waiver 
As courts grappled with which factors could be used to establish 
prohibitive costs and whether that analysis should be individualized 
or should apply to a class of plaintiffs, proponents of mandatory 
arbitration also began incorporating a class waiver that required the 
signatory to submit any post-agreement claims to individualized 
arbitration and waive any procedural right to proceed as a class. The 
effect of such waivers meant that some class claims—claims not 
worth pursuing in individual arbitration—simply would not be 
brought. But how should the effect of these waivers be viewed in 
light of Randolph’s admonition that an arbitration agreement that 
deprives a prospective litigant of the opportunity to vindicate a 
statutory right will not be enforced? 
In Kristian v. Comcast Corp., the First Circuit became one of the 
first courts to invalidate an arbitration agreement with a class 
arbitration waiver because it posed “prohibitive costs” to vindicating 
statutory rights.146 The Kristian plaintiffs attempted to assert class 
claims for federal and state antitrust violations against Comcast, but 
Comcast’s arbitration agreement included a non-severable class 
 
are likely to involve damages in amounts that are less than the typical arbitration. See Lampley, 
supra note 14, at 512–17; see also Cooper v. MRM Inv. Co., 367 F.3d 493, 509–11 (6th Cir. 2004) 
(adopting Morrison and emphasizing that a court must evaluate the cost of arbitration not only 
relative to the litigant’s ability to pay, but “relative to the likely costs of litigation”). 
 146. 446 F.3d 25, 61 (1st Cir. 2006) (“If the class mechanism prohibition here is enforced, 
Comcast will be essentially shielded from private consumer antitrust enforcement liability, even 
in cases where it has violated the law. Plaintiffs will be unable to vindicate their statutory 
rights.”). Kristian correctly recognized that there may be a question as to whether the presence 
of a class arbitration bar poses a “question of arbitrability” to be decided by a court, rather than 
an arbitrator under Bazzle and PacifiCare. Because Randolph was decided before either Bazzle or 
PacifiCare, it did not address whether the issue of prohibitive costs preventing a prospective 
litigant from vindicating statutory rights should be a question of arbitrability resolved by a court 
instead of an arbitrator. Nothing, however, suggests that this question—whether a prospective 
litigant is deprived of enforcing statutory rights at all due to the operation of the arbitration 
clause—should be a question outside of Bazzle’s grant of authority for the court. 
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arbitration waiver.147 The plaintiffs argued that the arbitration 
agreement—by depriving them of the opportunity to pursue class 
claims—deprived them of the opportunity to vindicate their antitrust 
claims.148 The plaintiffs submitted expert affidavits by (1) an 
attorney with twenty-six years of experience in litigating class 
actions; (2) a former justice of the Massachusetts Superior Court; 
and (3) an economist, who opined that to prove their claims, the 
plaintiffs would have to undertake an elaborate factual inquiry that 
included defining the relevant market; establishing the market power 
of the defendants and the effects of potential competition; 
determining the impact of any non-incumbent competitors in the 
market; analyzing the alleged violative agreements, as well as any 
merger/asset purchase agreements in which defendants had been 
involved; analyzing rate increases over time; and otherwise 
calculating damages.149 
The plaintiffs’ economist estimated that expert fees would cost 
between $300,000 and $600,000, not including direct costs such as 
“travel” and “computer analysis.”150 The plaintiffs’ class-action 
attorney who was proffered as an expert averred that “competent 
attorneys” would “expend several million dollars of attorneys’ time 
and hundreds of thousands of dollars in expenses, including expert 
witness fees.”151 According to these experts, each putative class 
member’s recovery, even if trebled according to the antitrust statute, 
would range from a “few hundred dollars to perhaps a few thousand 
dollars.”152 Todd, the former state court justice proffered by the 
plaintiffs as an expert, opined that “the individual 
consumer/subscriber’s cases would be extremely compromised, and 
effectively precluded, without the testimony of expert witnesses.”153 
 
 147. Id. at 30–32. 
 148. Id. at 37. 
 149. Id. at 58. 
 150. Id. The court never questioned the necessity of using such experts—a class-action 
attorney and a former judge—as experts in an antitrust case. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. at 54. 
 153. Id. at 58. If the “costs” observed in Kristian are indeed the appropriate costs a court 
should consider under a prohibitive costs argument, the next question is whether opinions 
offered by judges and members of the bar opining that the costs of the case will prevent bringing 
such claims are of the type admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, or whether Rule 702 
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Giving no mention to the Bradford factors or even a Morrison 
analysis, the court held that Comcast’s arbitration agreement was 
unenforceable as drafted because it deprived the plaintiffs of the 
opportunity to vindicate their statutory rights.154 This prohibitive 
costs holding was based on (1) the “complexity of an antitrust case 
generally,”155 (2) the costs of plaintiffs’ proposed expert fees as 
contrasted to each plaintiff’s potential recovery, and (3) the lack of a 
monetary incentive to encourage attorney representation in 
individual antitrust arbitration.156 The Kristian court failed to 
recognize that even if individual claims could not be aggregated in a 
formal class proceeding pursuant to the arbitration agreement, 
nothing prevented the plaintiffs—and the plaintiffs’ attorneys—from 
informally coordinating efforts on factual discovery, expert witness, 
and litigation preparation to defray costs. Putting aside this 
oversight, the Kristian court’s holding can basically be attributed to a 
lack of incentives for the consumer to pursue low-dollar claims and a 
lack of incentives for attorneys to represent consumers in connection 
with low-dollar claims.157 Most notably absent from Kristian’s 
holding was any requirement that plaintiffs compare the costs of 
proceeding in arbitration versus the costs of pursuing litigation.158 
 
should even apply. 
 154. Id. at 58–59. The Kristian court did acknowledge that the weight of circuit courts had 
found no “prohibitive costs” defense based on the class-action waiver in the context of Truth in 
Lending claims. See id. at 56–58 (analyzing Johnson v. W. Suburban Bank, 225 F.3d 366, 374 (3d 
Cir. 2000)). But the court distinguished those cases based on the complexity of prosecuting an 
antitrust claim and the imbedded costs involved in fees as alleged by the plaintiffs’ experts. Id. at 
58. Instead, the court likened this case, in which the plaintiffs would have no incentive to pursue 
their claims, to cases in which courts had found class action/arbitration waivers unconscionable. 
Id. at 60 (finding support in Ting v. AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126, 1130 (9th Cir. 2003)). 
 155. Id. at 58. 
 156. Id. at 59 & n.21. Kristian recognized that antitrust statutes provide for an award of 
attorney’s fees to prevailing plaintiffs. But it reasoned that, aside from being a poor investment, 
“being made whole is hardly a sufficient incentive for an attorney to invest in a case such as this 
when time spent on more predictable cases would be advantageous, and frankly, rational.” Id. at 
59 n.21. 
 157. Id. at 61. The response to the Kristian court’s vindication-of-statutory-rights decision 
based on the consumer’s lack of incentives is that it would be entirely reasonable for the 
prospective litigant to relinquish the right or capability to litigate expensive, complex claims with 
a proportionally small payoff in exchange for the opportunity to cost effectively arbitrate more 
substantial claims with a proportionally advantageous payoff. 
 158. The court also found the class arbitration waiver severable and ordered the arbitration 
to proceed on a class or consolidated basis. Of course, this piece of the court’s holding is called 
into serious doubt by Concepcion, which recognized the inherent infeasibility of arbitrating class 
claims when the parties did not specifically contemplate this result. AT&T Mobility LLC v. 
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Kristian’s holding that an arbitration agreement that deprives 
litigants of an incentive to arbitrate claims when the litigants could 
not proceed as a class caught on in the wake of class 
action/arbitration waivers. In Dale v. Comcast Corp., the Eleventh 
Circuit reframed the analysis as a “totality of the facts and 
circumstances test” in which relevant circumstances include: 
[T]he fairness of the provisions, the cost to an individual plaintiff of 
vindicating the claim when compared to the plaintiff’s potential 
recovery, the ability to recover attorneys’ fees and other costs and 
thus obtain legal representation to prosecute the underlying claim, 
the practical affect the waiver will have on a company’s ability to 
engage in unchecked market behavior, and related public policy 
concerns.159 
This broad “totality of facts and circumstances” test proffered by 
the Dale court is a far stretch from the original Bradford cost-based 
factors. It also conflates traditional “unconscionability” arguments 
based on fairness of the provision and public policy with what, prior 
to Kristian, was a relatively straight-forward inquiry about the cost of 
arbitration as compared to litigation or the litigant’s ability to pay. 
Following Concepcion, some courts have rejected the argument 
embraced in Kristian that by dissolving any “incentive” to bring suit 
via a class waiver, the arbitration agreement is unenforceable as 
prohibiting the plaintiffs from vindicating statutory rights.160 In 
Coneff v. AT&T Corp., the court was faced with the same fee-shifting 
and consumer-friendly provisions present in Concepcion.161 The 
plaintiffs launched a two-pronged argument: (1) that the class 
action/arbitration waiver was prohibitively expensive because the 
claims at issue were worth much less than the costs of litigating 
them; and (2) even if the consumer-friendly provisions of the 
arbitration agreements would make plaintiffs whole, most customers 
lacked any incentive to bring such claims.162 The court held that 
 
Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1751 (2011). 
 159. 498 F.3d 1216, 1224 (11th Cir. 2007). 
 160. Coneff v. AT&T Corp., 673 F.3d 1155, 1158 (9th Cir. 2012); Cruz v. Cingular 
Wireless, LLC, 648 F.3d 1205, 1215 (11th Cir. 2011) (rejecting the plaintiff’s argument that the 
class-action/arbitration waiver prohibited them from vindicating statutory rights based on the 
conclusion in Concepcion that under the same fee-shifting agreement, consumers would be made 
whole). 
 161. 673 F.3d at 1158. 
 162. Id. at 1158–59. 
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Randolph is still viable law in light of Concepcion—if a plaintiff faces 
costs that would render arbitration prohibitively expensive such that 
the plaintiff cannot vindicate statutory rights, then the arbitration 
agreement may be unenforceable. But, on a factual basis, the Coneff 
court held that the actual presence of prohibitive expenses in this 
same agreement had been addressed by Concepcion, which concluded 
that by virtue of the fee-shifting and “windfall” provisions, the 
consumers would be made whole, if not better off, by proceeding in 
arbitration as opposed to class litigation.163 As to the argument that 
no rational consumer would bring such a low-value claim 
individually,164 the Coneff court held that Concepcion precludes the 
consideration of this “policy-related” concern.165 
C. Culmination of Prohibitive Costs: In re American Express Litigation 
In the most anti-arbitration case since Concepcion, American 
Express, the Second Circuit affirmed its prior holding(s) that the 
“cost of plaintiffs’ individually arbitrating their dispute with Amex 
would be prohibitive, effectively depriving plaintiffs of the statutory 
protections of the antitrust laws.”166 What is truly unusual about 
American Express is that this agreement was between two business 
entities—American Express and individual small business owners—
as opposed to between a consumer and a corporation or employer 
and employee.167 In this near-classic commercial dispute, the parties 
have been litigating for nine years about whether the plaintiffs’ 
agreement to waive the procedural opportunity to participate in 
arbitration as a class is enforceable.168 The Second Circuit visited 
 
 163. Id.; see also Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1753. 
 164. This is an “incentive” argument as opposed to the earlier “means” argument. 
 165. Coneff, 673 F.3d at 1159 (relying on a one sentence response to the dissent in 
Concepcion which acknowledged that “[s]tates cannot require a procedure that is inconsistent 
with the FAA, even if it is desirable for unrelated reasons.” (quoting Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 
1753)). Whether this statement in fact foreclosed any incentive-based argument based on 
prohibitive costs is indeed questionable. 
 166. Amex III, 667 F.3d 204, 217 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 167. In re Am. Express Merchs.’ Litig., No. 03 CV 9592, 2006 WL 662341 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 
16, 2006) rev’d and remanded sub nom In re Am. Express Merchs.’ Litig., 554 F.3d 300, 302 (2d 
Cir. 2009), cert. granted, judgment vacated Am. Exp. Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 130 S. Ct. 2401 
(2010) [hereinafter “Amex I”]; In re Am. Express Merchs.’ Litig., 634 F.3d 187, 188–89 (2d Cir. 
2011) adhered to on reh’g, In re Am. Exp. Merchs.’ Litig., 634 F.3d 187 (2d Cir. 2011) [hereinafter 
“Amex II”]; Amex III, 667 F.3d at 207. 
 168. It is worth noting that the plaintiffs filed suit in 2003. American Express moved to 
dismiss the case in favor of arbitration in 2004. Docket Entry 20, In re Am. Express Litig. 
DO NOT DELETE 1/27/2014 10:20 AM 
825 The Price of Justice 
 859 
this issue four times.169 Each time the Second Circuit found the 
arbitration agreement with class waiver to be unenforceable due to 
prohibitive costs.170 Most recently, five of the thirteen active judges 
on the Second Circuit dissented from the Second Circuit’s denial of 
American Express’s petition for rehearing en banc, with Judge 
Cabranes appealing that “the matter can and should be resolved by 
the Supreme Court”171 and Chief Judge Jacobs declaring that 
appellate review is necessary because American Express “is already 
working mischief in the district courts.”172 
The American Express plaintiffs are merchants who accepted 
defendant American Express’s payment card products.173 The 
plaintiffs sought to bring claims for alleged antitrust violations on 
behalf of a national merchant class.174 However, the plaintiffs each 
 
1:03CV09592. And the parties have been caught up in the arbitration web for the past nine 
years. This is certainly not the easy, streamlined alternative resolution process the parties 
presumably contemplated when they originally agreed to arbitrate their claims. 
 169. See supra note 167; In re Am. Express Litig., 681 F.3d 139 (2d Cir. 2012) (denying 
petition for rehearing en banc) [hereinafter Amex IV]. 
 170. Amex III, 667 F.3d at 206 (concluding that the Supreme Court’s decision in Concepcion 
does not alter the Second Circuit’s previous analysis). 
 171. Amex IV, 681 F.3d at 149 (Cabranes, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). 
 172. Id. at 143. 
 173. These plaintiffs came from two different geographic regions: New York and California. 
Amex I, 554 F.3d 300, 305 (2d. Cir. 2009). The National Supermarkets Association, which 
represents the interests of individually owned supermarkets, was also a named plaintiff. Id. 
 174. The merchant agreement to which the plaintiffs agreed included an “Honor All 
Cards” provision, which required the plaintiffs to accept all American Express cards. In re Am. 
Express Merchs.’ Litig., 03 CV 9592 (GBD), 2006 WL 662341 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 16, 2006) at *1. At 
the heart of the dispute is the distinction between “charge cards” and “credit cards.” Amex I, 554 
F.3d at 305. A charge card requires its holder to pay the balance in full at the end of each billing 
cycle. In contrast, a credit card permits the holder to pay a portion of the balance at the end of 
each billing cycle, and interest accrues on the remaining balance. In re Am. Express Merchants 
Litig., 2006 WL 662341 at *1 n.6. According to the plaintiffs, “[h]olders of charge cards are 
more affluent than credit cardholders, and a vastly higher percentage of charge cards than credit 
cards are held by businesses and used for business travel and other corporate purposes.” 554 
F.3d at 307. Indeed, the plaintiffs alleged that Amex itself contended that “the average purchase 
on an American Express card is 17% higher than the average purchase made on a credit card.” 
Id. Thus, the plaintiffs-merchants wanted to attract “charge card” customers who were likely to 
spend more money, and Amex has been able to charge high merchant discount fees. Id. The 
plaintiffs allege that Amex’s fees were at least 35% higher than Amex’s competitor rates. Id. at 
308. 
By requiring that a merchant agree to Amex’s “Honor All Cards” provision, Amex was 
able to leverage its market dominance in charge cards to generate equally large fees for its 
burgeoning credit card business. Id. The practice of requiring a merchant to honor all of its 
cards, according to Plaintiffs, amounted to an illegal tying arrangement in violation of Section 1 
of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1. Id. Plaintiffs also asserted claims alleging that Amex 
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signed an arbitration agreement waiving any procedural right to 
participate in arbitration in a representative capacity or as a member 
of a class.175 Each time this case has been examined by the Second 
Circuit (on initial review, and then on remand following Stolt-Nielsen 
and Concepcion), the court has held, “as a matter of law,”176 that the 
costs of individual arbitration would be prohibitive.177 
The Second Circuit’s panel decisions are based on evidence 
presented by the plaintiffs that is similar to that presented in 
Kristian.178 The plaintiffs submitted the affidavit of Dr. French, an 
economist who offered opinions regarding “the likely costs and 
complexity of an expert economic study concerning the liability and 
damages” related to the antitrust action, and “whether it would be 
economically rational for such a merchant to pursue recovery of 
damages given the likely out-of-pocket costs of the arbitration or 
litigation proceeding.”179 
The plaintiffs’ expert opined that the cost of his own consulting 
firm’s expert assistance in “individual plaintiff antitrust cases has 
ranged from about $300 thousand to more than $2 million.”180 He 
opined that the individual cost for the Amex plaintiffs would fall in 
the middle of this range,181 at something over $1 million. The 
plaintiffs’ expert went on to aver that: 
The median volume merchant, with half of the named plaintiffs 
having more and half having less American Express charge volume, 
and having reported $230,343 American Express Card volume in 
2003, might expect four-year damages of $1,751, or $5,252 when 
trebled. . . . The largest volume named plaintiff merchant, with 
reported American Express Card volume of $1,690,749 in 2003, 
 
maintains a monopoly by imposing a collective action waiver in violation of Section 2 of the 
Sherman act, and various state common law claims for unjust enrichment and violations of 
California’s Unfair Competition Law. 2006 WL 662341 at *2. 
 175. Amex III, 607 F.3d at 209. 
 176. It is curious that the court framed this intensely factual-based finding as a “matter of 
law.” Id. at 217. 
 177. Now Supreme Court Justice Sotomayor was on the panel of Amex I. Each subsequent 
panel on remand has been addressed by the remaining panel of Judges Pooler and Sack. Justice 
Sotomayor recused herself from the Supreme Court’s review of Amex III. 
 178. See supra Part IV.B. and accompanying notes. 
 179. Amex III, 667 F.3d at 217. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. 
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might expect four-year damages of $12,850, or $38,549 when 
trebled. 
In my opinion as a professional economist . . . it would not be worthwhile 
for an individual plaintiff . . . to pursue individual arbitration or 
litigation where the out-of-pocket costs, just for the expert economic study and 
services, would be at least several hundred thousand dollars, and might exceed 
$1 million.182 
Based on this opinion, the Second Circuit found that “trebling of 
a small individual damages award is not going to pay the expert fees 
Dr. French has estimated will be necessary to make an individual 
plaintiff’s case” here.183 The Second Circuit held that the district 
court failed to consider that the Supreme Court has held that when a 
prevailing party seeks reimbursement of fees paid to its own expert 
witnesses, the federal court is bound by the limits of 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1821(b)—an amount that is currently forty dollars per diem.184 
Even more importantly, the court held that the fee-shifting 
provisions of the Clayton Act must be discounted to include “the 
risk of losing, and thereby not recovering any fees” to fully 
encompass a potential plaintiff’s evaluation of the suit’s potential 
costs.185 
The court found that this cost-based analysis of the prospective 
litigants’ rational choice “flatly ensures that no small merchant may 
challenge American Express’s tying arrangement under the federal 
antitrust laws.”186 Because the class waiver effectively precluded the 
plaintiffs from enforcing statutory rights, the court held it 
unenforceable.187 The two-judge panel continued to assert two 
important “caveats” to its decision: (1) that the decision “in no way 
 
 182. Id. at 218 (emphasis added). 
 183. Id. 
 184. Amex I, 554 F.3d 300, 318 (2009) (quoting Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons Inc., 
482 U.S. 437, 439, 107 (1987) superseded by statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1988(c) (1991) as recognized in 
U.S. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. W&O Inc., 213 F.3d 600, 620 (2000)). Whether the 
district court failed to consider this limitation is not entirely clear. From the district court’s 
opinion, it found that the benefits of treble damages and fee-shifting provided sufficient 
incentive for plaintiffs to bring individual suit—not that the entirety of the plaintiffs’ arbitration 
costs would be funded if successful. Indeed, in a litigation context rarely are the prevailing 
parties able to recover 100% of costs, expert fees, and attorney fees. Amex I, supra note 166, at 
*1. 
 185. Amex III, 667 F.3d at 218 (quoting Amex I, 554 F.3d at 317). 
 186. Id. (quoting Amex I, 554 F.3d at 319). 
 187. Id. 
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relies on the status of plaintiffs as ‘small’ merchants;”188 and (2) 
that the court did not hold that class-action waivers in arbitration, or 
even arbitration of antitrust matters were per se unenforceable.189 
These limitations were important because the first was an attempt to 
distinguish this decision concerning commercial litigants 
purportedly enforcing a federal statute from the consumer line of 
cases (notably Discover Bank), rendering such clauses unenforceable 
because they were unconscionable under state law. The second 
limitation was the Second Circuit’s way of “saving” the decision in 
this case from a wide-arching decision invalidating all arbitration 
clause-class waivers, which would most likely (and eventually was 
held to be) preempted by the Supreme Court. 
Despite these attempts to distinguish the consumer 
“unconscionability” cases, the Second Circuit’s factors it found 
relevant to the vindication of statutory rights analysis look and 
sound very much like those found in state common law 
unconscionablity rubrics: “the fairness of the provisions, the cost to 
an individual plaintiff of vindicating the claim when compared to the 
plaintiff’s potential recovery, the ability to recover attorneys’ fees 
and other costs and thus obtain legal representation to prosecute the 
underlying claim, the practical affect the waiver will have on a 
company’s ability to engage in unchecked market behavior, and 
related public policy concerns.”190 
The court reconciled its opinion with Concepcion by limiting 
Concepcion to the context of California’s state rule that required class-
 
 188. Amex I, 554 F.3d at 321 (quoting Dale v. Comcast Corp., 498 F.3d 1216, 1224 (11th 
Cir. 2007). This is a curious disclaimer given the express holding that “no small merchant” 
would be able to challenge American Express’s tying arrangement. Id. at 218. The court 
elaborated that it relied instead on the need for plaintiffs to have the opportunity to vindicate 
statutory rights. The court necessarily had to make it clear that this holding rested on the 
vindication of statutory rights defense to preserve its vitality after Concepcion. Id. at 219. 
 189. Id. at 219. 
 190. Id. at 213. Cf. Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1110 (Ca. 2005) 
overruled by AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011) (“[W]hen the waiver is 
found in a consumer contract of adhesion in a setting in which disputes between the contracting 
parties predictably involve small amounts of damages, and when it is alleged that the party with 
the superior bargaining power has carried out a scheme to deliberately cheat large numbers of 
consumers out of individually small sums of money, then, at least to the extent the obligation at 
issue is governed by California law, the waiver becomes in practice the exemption of the party 
from responsibility for [its] own fraud, or willful injury to the person or property of another. 
Under these circumstances, such waivers are unconscionable under California law and should 
not be enforced.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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wide arbitration in circumstances that met the Discover Bank 
factors.191 To give the Second Circuit some credit, some 
commentators have noted Concepcion’s enigmatic decision.192 When 
faced with the opportunity to hold that class-action waivers with 
certain provisions are presumed enforceable under the FAA, the 
Court did not reach so far. Instead, the Court held that the Discover 
Bank rule was preempted and that the FAA did not contemplate the 
complexity of class arbitration.193 
Nonetheless, Concepcion was clearly a strong pro-arbitration case. 
The Second Circuit admitted as much when it stated that “it is 
tempting to give both Concepcion and Stolt-Nielsen . . . . a facile 
reading, and find that the cases render class action arbitration 
waivers per se enforceable.”194 But the court rejected this reading and 
explained that its prior Amex decisions addressed the issue of 
“whether a class-action arbitration waiver clause is enforceable even if 
the plaintiffs are able to demonstrate that the practical effect of 
enforcement would be to preclude their ability to vindicate their 
federal statutory rights.”195 This question, according to the court, 
had not been addressed by Concepcion or Stolt-Nielsen. Thus, Concepcion 
and Stolt-Nielsen, taken together, were read by the Second Circuit to 
stand “squarely” for the principle that parties cannot be forced to 
arbitrate disputes in a class-action arbitration unless the parties 
agreed to do so.196 
In contrast to the arbitration agreement addressed by the Court’s 
2011 decision in Concepcion, the Amex agreement did not contain an 
imbedded fee-shifting provision by which American Express agreed 
to pay some or all costs of arbitration, regardless of whether the 
plaintiff prevailed.197 It also did not have an “incentivizing clause” 
by which American Express would pay an individual plaintiff a 
“windfall” for claims not timely and appropriately settled by 
 
 191. Amex III, 667 F.3d at 213. 
 192. See, e.g., Colin P. Marks, The Irony of AT&T v. Concepcion, 87 IND. L.J. SUPPLEMENT 31, 
32 (2012) (acknowledging that the majority opinion in Concepcion is “open to multiple 
interpretations”). 
 193. Amex III, 667 F.3d at 212 (attempting to limit Concepcion to a case concerning 
preemption of a state law unconscionability rule). 
 194. Id. (emphasis added). While it would be a stretch to consider Stolt-Nielsen this 
broadly, Concepcion comes close. 
 195. Id.(emphasis added). 
 196. Id. 
 197. Id. at 209–10. 
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American Express outside of the arbitration process.198 Given that 
the American Express merchant contract was an agreement between 
two businesses (although not necessarily at “arms length”),199 it is 
not unreasonable that American Express would expect any 
prospective litigant to fund its own costs of dispute resolution, as 
would any commercial litigant in court. Nonetheless, the plaintiffs 
conceded by the time this case reached the Court, that had such 
provisions been present, they would have been unable to succeed in 
the lower court on a prohibitive costs basis.200 
Thus, the Second Circuit relied on Kristian to employ a mixture 
of a cost-benefit and incentive-based approach to hold that the class 
waiver in the Amex arbitration agreement deprived the plaintiffs of 
vindication of their antitrust claims. The court’s two-pronged 
approach was based on the opinion of an economist that expert fees 
would outweigh any potential plaintiff’s individual recovery (the 
cost/benefit approach) and the economist’s opinion that no rational 
litigant would pursue these claims (the incentive approach). 
V. AMERICAN EXPRESS FAILS TO ADDRESS THE ANALYTICAL 
FRAMEWORK FOR A COST-BASED DEFENSE 
During the publication of this Article, the Court issued its 
opinion in American Express.201 As predicted, the Court reversed the 
Second Circuit’s opinion in American Express and held that the 
arbitration agreement is enforceable despite the plaintiffs’ lack of 
economic incentives to pursue individual arbitration claims.202 What 
is somewhat surprising is that the Court’s opinion almost entirely 
avoided the issue of what type of costs should be properly 
considered in analyzing a cost-based defense to arbitration.203 
 
 198.  Id. 
 199. The district court found that the Amex merchant agreement was a form contract and 
could not be negotiated with individualized terms by the merchant plaintiffs. Amex I, supra note 
167, at *2. 
 200. Brief for Respondents at 44, Am. Express Co., 133 S. Ct. 594 (No. 12-133), 2013 WL 
267025, at *44 (“If Petitioners’ arbitration clause contained such pro-vindication clauses [such 
as fee and cost-shifting], Respondents would not be here.”). 
 201. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S.Ct. 2304 (2013). 
 202. Id. at 2310. 
 203. See id. at 2317–18 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (recognizing that while the majority is “quite 
sure that the effective-vindication rules does not apply” it “has precious little to say about why” 
and discussing the majority’s failure to address the seminal issue in the case, which is what type 
of costs are properly considered in a cost-based defense to arbitration). 
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The Court’s decision rested on two grounds. First, the Court 
recognized an issue not specifically in contention—there is no 
Congressional command in the Sherman Act or elsewhere that 
antitrust laws evince an intention to preclude a class-action 
waiver.204 As the Court recognized, the antitrust laws were enacted 
before Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 and long before popular 
use of the class waiver in arbitration.205 Therefore, Congress would 
not likely have included such a provision at the time of their 
enactment. Yet the inclusion of this basis in the Court’s opinion 
sends a clear message to Congress: speak clearly as to the class-
waiver issue in any federal statute, or it may be subject to individual 
arbitration. 
The Court then turned to the central issue in the case: whether 
enforcing the class-action waiver deprives the litigants of effective 
vindication of rights under the antitrust laws because they had no 
“economic incentive” to pursue individual arbitration claims in light of 
high expert costs.206 Scalia, writing for the majority, first discussed the 
origin of the “effective vindication” doctrine, recognizing it as a judge-
made exception originating out of Mitsubishi Motors.207 But without 
explanation, the majority called the entire existence of the effective 
vindication doctrine into question by characterizing Mitsubishi’s holding, 
previously relied on by courts in hundreds of cases since, as mere 
“dictum.”208 Why the Court ventured thus far is not clear from the 
opinion—there was no need to call into question the “effective 
vindication” doctrine to resolve this case. And the Court certainly did 
not go so far as to overrule Mitsubishi or the long line of cases 
recognizing the effective vindication defense. Still further, the Court’s 
attempt to characterize Mitsubishi’s holding as limited to a “right to 
pursue statutory remedies” appearing in a footnote is suspect.209 As 
discussed in Part II.A. above, the cornerstone of Mitsubishi’s holding is 
that “so long as the prospective litigant effectively may vindicate its 
statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum, the statute will continue 
to serve both its remedial and deterrent function,” and the arbitral 
forum may be enforced.210 
 
 204. Id. at 2309. 
 205. Id. 
 206. Id. at 2310. 
 207. Id. See also supra notes 35–48 and accompanying text. 
 208. Id. 
 209. Id. at 2309. 
 210. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 637 (1985). 
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The Court could not seriously have intended to call into question 
the entire existence of this doctrine that has been the rule nearly 
thirty years, as evidenced by the majority’s reliance on subsequent 
cases asserting the existence of the “effective vindication” 
exception.211 Nonetheless, whether the “effective vindication” 
doctrine is now narrowed to only a right to pursue, as opposed to 
vindicate, federal statutory claims is something left for later cases to 
resolve. Under either characterization, the possibility still exists that 
exorbitant costs could pose a barrier to even pursuit of statutory 
claims. The question unanswered by the Court is what type of costs 
could lead to a viable cost-based defense. 
There is, of course, some common ground. The majority and 
dissent agree that Mitsubishi’s “effective vindication” doctrine would 
“certainly” require invalidating an arbitration agreement 
prospectively forbidding the right to recover under federal statutory 
rights.212 And the Court mentioned, enigmatically, that the 
“effective vindication” doctrine would “perhaps” operate to 
invalidate an arbitration agreement in which “filing and 
administrative fees attached to arbitration . . . are so high as to 
make access to the forum impracticable.”213 The “perhaps” 
 
Justice Kagan addressed the majority’s shortcomings on this ground in her dissent, joined by 
Justices Ginsburg and Breyer: “The majority is dead wrong when it says that Mitsubishi reserved 
judgment on ‘whether the arbitration agreement’s potential deprivation of a claimant’s right to 
pursue federal remedies may render that agreement unenforceable.” Amer. Express, 133 S. Ct. at 
2317 n.3 (emphasis added). As the dissent recognizes, the effective vindication doctrine “began 
as a core part of Mitsubishi.” Am. Express, 133 S. Ct. at 2317 (quoting Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 637). 
 211. Am. Express, 133 S. Ct. at 2317 at 2310 (citing 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 
247, 273–74, (2009) and Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 28 (1991)). 
Professor Jean Sternlight has written: “With this decision the Court has also fully endorsed 
companies’ use of mandatory arbitration provisions to block access to justice rather than to 
provide an alternative means of obtaining access to justice.” Jean Sternlight, American Express Co. 
v. Italian Restaurant Guts Enforcement of Federal Laws, ADR PROF BLOG, (June 2013), available at 
http://www.indisputably.org/?p=4750. American Express, limited to its holding that the 
vindication of statutory rights doctrine cannot be used to render arbitration agreements 
unenforceable based on an argument that plaintiffs lack economic incentives to bring such 
claims, cannot be said to block access to justice. This is because plaintiffs will simply not bring 
claims they otherwise would not bring in court individually. But, if American Express is construed 
to mean that a true cost-based defense, in which the costs of arbitration are prohibitively 
expensive under a comparative framework, is no longer a viable defense, then Professor 
Sternlight’s characterization of this case meets the mark. 
 212. Id. at 2310, 2313. But because the “effective vindication” doctrine is likely limited to 
vindicating federal rights, it would be of no help for a prospective waiver of recovery under state 
law. 
 213. Id. at 2310–11. The dissenters would have no problem holding that the effective 
vindication rule covers such filing fees. Id. at 2314 (acknowledging that an agreement might 
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modifying this principal is certainly a troubling foreshadowing for 
future “effective vindication” cases, because the fact that arbitration 
costs as compared to litigation costs could pose an impermissible 
barrier to vindication of federal statutory rights has been the 
accepted state of the law since Randolph.214 And, as argued in this 
Article, is the analytical framework for any cost-based defense that 
adequately serves the purpose of the FAA and effective vindication of 
federal law. On the other end of the spectrum, what is clearly not 
covered by the “effective vindication” doctrine are “low value” 
claims, which are not economically rational to pursue individually 
because the costs of arbitration/litigation outweigh the potential 
recoverable damages.215 Thus, the Court inherently rejected any 
rubric that would permit invalidating an arbitration clause under an 
incentive-based approach alleging that the costs of individual 
arbitration prevent the effective vindication of federal rights. 
But what is left after American Express is some significant middle 
ground with unanswered questions. In the hypothetical posed by the 
dissent, Justice Kagan asks if the effective vindication rule would 
prohibit an arbitration agreement that precludes a claimant from 
presenting proof intrinsic to the plaintiff’s claim—such as economic 
testimony?216 The majority does not take the bait, responding only 
that “it is not a given” that such a clause would constitute an 
impermissible waiver. But more importantly, the majority points 
out, if such a clause did render vindication of a statutory right 
impossible, the result would be the same individually or as a 
class.217 
 
prohibit vindication of statutory rights by setting “outlandish” filing fees, or establishing an 
absurd statute of limitations). 
 214. See supra Part IV.A. The Court’s calling into question the use of a cost-based defense 
based on arbitration fees as compared to litigation fees is particularly surprising given that such 
dicta was not necessary to reach the Court’s holding, and the fact that some of the majority 
expressed the view in oral argument that such a comparison was, indeed, proper. See infra note 
240. The primary reason that the majority may be shying away from an arbitration vs. litigation 
cost comparison is that it would require some “tallying” of the arbitration costs vs. litigation 
costs in the enforcement phase. American Express, 133 S.Ct. at 2311–12. But this tallying should 
not impose the type of costs and burdens that would be unwieldy or defeat the purpose of the 
FAA. 
 215. Am. Express, 133 S. Ct. at 2311. 
 216. Id. at 2314. 
 217. Id. at 2311. Why is this such an important distinction? Because the plaintiffs in 
American Express claimed that it was the contractual waiver of the class action that deprived them 
of the ability to effectively vindicate their antitrust claims. But as the Court noted, this is simply 
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In sum, although American Express continues the Court’s 
favorable treatment of arbitration as the alternative path to litigation 
and demonstrates that waiver of the class action is here to stay (until 
or unless Congress precludes it), the Court did not specifically adopt 
any framework to guide the lower courts as to how to analyze a cost-
based defense under Mitsubishi/Randolph.218 As discussed below, the 
comparative approach is the sole approach that is consistent with 
Mitsubishi, Randolph, and now American Express. 
VI. ANY DEFENSE TO ARBITRATION BASED ON PROHIBITIVE COSTS 
SHOULD BE BASED ON COMPARING TRUE ARBITRAL COSTS TO 
LITIGATION COSTS 
Since the Court’s recognition of a prohibitive-costs-based 
defense in Randolph, lower courts have analyzed the costs that must 
be proven to avoid arbitration under four different rubrics: (1) the 
subjective approach, which compares the costs of arbitration to the 
litigant’s ability to pay;219 (2) the comparative approach, which 
 
a limitation of arbitration to the individual contracting parties, not a foreclosure of the cause of 
action, prohibition of proof, or deprivation of a statutory remedy. Id. at 2311. 
 218. One key issue that both the Court and the dissent inadequately addressed in American 
Express, was the possibility, or impossibility, of the plaintiffs sharing the costs of the allegedly 
prohibitively expensive expert fees even if they could not proceed as a class. See id. at 2311 n.4 
(arguing that cost-sharing was permitted)); and id. at 2318 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“The 
agreement’s problem is that it bars not just class actions, but also all mechanisms—many 
existing long before the Sherman Act, if that matters—for joinder or consolidation of claims, 
informal coordination among individual claimants, or amelioration of arbitral expenses.”). If 
plaintiffs could have shared such fees, even in the form of a trade agreement to hire an expert, 
this should have allayed any prohibitive cost concern and should have resolved the case. See 
Transcript of Oral Argument at 20–21, Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 594 
(2012). The Court’s avoidance of this issue is confounding, particularly given the petitioner’s 
concession at oral argument that such costs could be shared. Id. at 20:20–22:6. 
 219. See, e.g., Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, 317 F.3d 646, 658–65 (6th Cir. 2003) 
(holding that “the reviewing court should define the class of such similarly situated potential 
litigants by job description and socioeconomic background. It should take the actual plaintiff’s 
income and resources as representative of this larger class’s ability to shoulder the costs of 
arbitration” in considering whether the arbitration agreement posed prohibitive costs); Blair v. 
Scott Specialty Gases, 283 F.3d 595, 610 (3d Cir. 2002) (analyzing the litigant’s projected costs 
of arbitration in comparison with evidence that the claimant would not be able to pay the equal 
burden of cost due to her limited financial capacity to determine prohibitive costs); Hardin v. 
Morningside of Jackson, L.L.C., 425 F. Supp. 2d 898, 900, 907–09 (W.D. Tenn. 2006) (applying 
Morrison v. Circuit City Stores in a four-step analysis which includes the “plaintiff’s experience, 
background, and education”); Phillips v. Assoc. Home Equity Services, Inc., 179 F. Supp. 2d 840, 
846–47 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (accepting evidence from the plaintiff of filing costs for arbitration and 
the plaintiff’s financial straits that would prohibit her from paying, ultimately ruling that the 
costs of arbitration were prohibitive); accord James v. Conceptus, Inc., 851 F. Supp. 2d 1020, 
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compares the costs of arbitration to costs of proceeding in 
litigation;220 (3) the cost-benefit approach, which compares the 
costs of arbitration to the likelihood of plaintiff’s potential 
recovery;221 and (4) the incentive-based approach, which considers 
whether the plaintiffs or their potential attorneys have any incentive 
given the costs involved, to pursue their claims.222 The source and 
relevance of each of these frameworks raises concerns about the 
 
1035 (S.D. Tex. 2012) (accepting the plaintiff’s evidence that he had no current income, savings, 
nor could he afford to pay for the arbitration fees, thus making the cost-splitting provision 
prohibitively expensive); Price v. Taylor, 575 F. Supp. 2d 845, 854 (N.D. Ohio 2008) 
(emphasizing that a party seeking to invalidate an arbitration agreement for prohibitive costs 
based on unconscionability must prove the likelihood of incurring those costs with evidence of 
plaintiff’s financial situation, and arbitration costs of similar cases). 
 220. See, e.g., James v. McDonald’s Corp., 417 F.3d 672, 679–80 (7th Cir. 2005) (noting the 
Plaintiff needed to provide evidence of both her own financial situation, and the comparative 
expense of litigation versus arbitration costs); Cooper v. MRM Inv. Co., 367 F.3d 493, 511 (6th 
Cir. 2004) (following the subjective approach from Morrison v. Circuit City Stores initially, but 
rounding out the analysis with a comparative approach, stating that a court must evaluate the 
likely cost of arbitration relative to the likely costs of litigation); Bradford v. Rockwell 
Semiconductor Sys., Inc., 238 F.3d 549, 556 n.5 (4th Cir. 2001) (“[A]n appropriate case-by-case 
inquiry must focus upon a claimant’s expected or actual arbitration costs and his ability to pay 
those costs, measured against a baseline of the claimant’s expected costs for litigation and his 
ability to pay those costs.”); accord Phillips v. Assoc. Home Equity Servs., Inc., 179 F. Supp. 2d 
840, 846–47 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (noting that plaintiff’s arbitration would be twelve times the costs 
of filing in federal court). 
 221. See, e.g., Dale v. Comcast Corp., 498 F.3d 1216, 1224 (11th Cir. 2007) (concluding 
that Kristian is instructive in the proper comparison analysis, and including “the cost to an 
individual plaintiff of vindicating the claim when compared to the plaintiff’s potential recovery” 
as a relevant factor); Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 25, 55 (1st Cir. 2006) (holding that 
based on the plaintiff’s experts opinion, the expert fees in arbitration outweighed any potential 
damages plaintiffs would recover through individual arbitration); Amex III arguably employed a 
quasi-cost benefit approach when it compared the costs of proceeding in arbitration with each 
individual plaintiff’s prospective damages. 667 F.3d at 218 (concluding that it was not 
“economically feasible” for the plaintiffs to pursue their claims individually, given the high 
expert fees); Myriam Gilles, Opting Out of Liability: The Forthcoming, Near-Total Demise of the 
Modern Class Action, 104 MICH. L. REV. 373 (2005) (noting that a case “sure to test this theory” is 
underway, referring to In re American Express). 
 222. For an example of a pure “incentive-based” approached see Coneff v. AT&T Corp., 673 
F.3d 1155, 1159 (9th Cir. 2012), which held that under the fee-shifting and consumer friendly 
provisions of the arbitration agreement, the plaintiffs had an adequate forum for pursuing their 
claims, but recognized the concern that there were no incentives to do so. See McKenzie v. Betts, 
55 So. 3d 615, 627–28 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011), review granted, 60 So. 3d 1055 (Fla. 2011) 
(concluding that the individual plaintiffs had a slim likelihood of a small recovery, thus the 
prohibitive costs prevented the plaintiffs from vindicating their statutory rights). See also 
Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1760–61 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (questioning “[w]hat rational lawyer 
would have signed on to represent the [plaintiffs] . . . for the possibility of fees stemming from 
a $30.22 claim?”). The Coneff court concluded that such “incentive-based” policy arguments are 
foreclosed by Concepcion. The Court’s opinion in American Express removes any doubt. 
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desirability and  
 
appropriateness of their use for determining whether any prospective 
litigant is actually deprived of vindication of statutory rights. 
First, the subjective approach, which is exemplified by Morrison 
and its progeny, stands for the principle that a pre-dispute 
arbitration agreement may be rendered unenforceable based on the 
litigant’s ability to pay for the arbitration.223 Morrison took a 
divergent path, of course, by not just looking to the means of the 
actual litigant, but to all “similarly situated” litigants to determine 
whether arbitral costs would be a deterrent to their assertion of 
statutory claims.224 But the most relevant inquiry, according to 
Morrison, was “the actual plaintiff’s income and resources . . . to 
shoulder the costs of arbitration.”225 The importance of this factor is 
highlighted by the court’s instruction to define the class of similarly 
situated potential litigants by “job description and socioeconomic 
background.”226 
At first blush, the subjective approach has merit. If a particular 
litigant, such as a low-wage worker, simply cannot afford the arbitral 
forum, then he or she should not be forced to litigate statutory 
claims in that forum. Further, this approach has some grounding in 
the scant guidance given by Randolph—footnote six did note that in 
attempting to prove her prohibitive costs argument, the plaintiff 
asserted that “[a]rbitration costs are high and that she did not have 
the resources to arbitrate.”227 Instead of rejecting the subjective 
approach as a valid cost-based argument, the Court concluded that 
Randolph’s evidence as to what the costs of her arbitration would be 
were too speculative.228 
Nonetheless, this approach makes little sense in terms of 
contractual expectations. As Morrison recognized, the effect of the 
subjective approach is to treat litigants differently based on income 
or socioeconomic background.229 Although it may make some sense 
 
 223. See supra note 219 and accompanying text. 
 224. Morrison, 317 F.3d at 663–64. 
 225. Id. 
 226. Id. 
 227. Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Alabama v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 91 n.6 (2000). 
 228. Id. 
 229. Morrison, 317 F.3d at 683 (acknowledging that “this analysis will yield different 
results in different cases”). 
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to treat “high-level managerial employees” (i.e., those with some 
level of sophistication) differently from low-level employees who 
have no discretionary income to fund arbitration of a statutory claim, 
it makes much less sense to do so in other contexts. For example, 
why should the affluent purchaser of a washing machine with a pre-
dispute arbitration clause in the purchase agreement be subject to 
arbitration when the “low-wage” earner is not? After all, they both 
paid the same price for the same product. Or worse yet, should the 
enforceability of the arbitration agreement depend on whether the 
model is a luxury model or base model? From this, other questions 
arise: what is the proper measure of subjective ability to pay; wealth, 
income, or a hybrid? Is the wealthy retiree with little to no income 
less able to vindicate statutory rights than the first year law firm 
associate with a high starting salary, and an enormous debt-load? 
Even in the employment context, in which one might suggest 
that wages earned bear some impact on the consideration given, the 
reasonableness of weighing the enforceability of the arbitration 
agreement against the claimant’s ability to pay is untenable. As the 
Morrison court recognized, any employee, after losing his or her job, 
will have a harder time funding dispute resolution than an employed 
person.230 When this analogy is extended to the commercial world, 
the absurdities abound. Are only Fortune 100 companies susceptible 
to binding pre-dispute arbitration agreements? Certainly that result 
has already been rejected in cases like Mitsubishi, in which the 
automobile dealer was held to its pre-dispute contractual agreement 
with the monolith Mitsubishi Motors Corporation. 
In sum, there is no reason that a wealthy or high-income litigant 
should be treated differently from a low-income litigant under a 
vindication of statutory rights analysis from a contractual point of 
view. Presumably, at the time of entering the arbitration agreement 
the parties were aware of their socioeconomic status and that their 
financial situation may change (which raises a new question: should 
the litigant’s ability to pay be measured at the time the agreement 
was signed, at the time the dispute arises, or at the point of filing a 
claim?). According to the language of Mitsubishi, the inquiry is 
focused on the prospective litigant’s ability to vindicate statutory 
 
 230. Morrison, 317 F.3d at 669–70 (acknowledging that the choice to pursue arbitration is 
really a choice that boils down to risking scarce resources in the hopes of uncertain benefit). 
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claims.231 So long as the parties, at the time of drafting the 
arbitration agreement, are not foreclosed of the opportunity to 
vindicate statutory rights by choosing the arbitral forum (and it is 
hard to see how they would be), the arbitration agreement should be 
upheld regardless of the parties’ changed circumstances. Thus, like 
the unconscionability analysis, the court’s focus under a vindication 
of statutory rights analysis should be guided by the ex ante position 
of the parties.232 There may be an argument that high-wage, 
managerial type employees (of the sort mentioned in Morrison) are 
more sophisticated, and thus, capable of understanding the terms of 
their agreement—but that is an argument more properly addressed 
on state law unconscionability grounds, which typically takes into 
account the relative sophistication of the parties under the 
procedural fairness prong.233 
The better framework, in as much as it is based on the text of 
Randolph,234 is the comparative approach by which the costs of 
proceeding in the arbitral forum are compared with the costs of 
proceeding in litigation. As noted above, many courts have 
emphasized this framework, including Bradford. The Bradford court 
aptly explained: “[t]he cost of arbitration, as far as its deterrent 
effect, cannot be measured in a vacuum or premised upon a 
claimant’s abstract contention that arbitration costs are “too 
high.”235 Rather, an appropriate case-by-case inquiry must focus on 
a claimant’s expected or actual arbitration costs measured against a 
baseline of the claimant’s expected costs for litigation. As previously 
discussed, Randolph did not elaborate on the proper factors a court 
should consider under a “prohibitive costs” analysis. But the Court 
 
 231. See supra note 52 and accompanying text. 
 232. See generally, 8 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS, § 18:10 (4th ed.); U.C.C. § 2-302 official 
cmt. See also, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 cmt c. (“The determination that a 
contract or term is or is not unconscionable is made in the light of its setting, purpose and 
effect.”); Stephen J. Ware, The Case for Enforcing Adhesive Arbitration Agreements—With Particular 
Consideration of Class Actions and Arbitration Fees, 5 J. AM. ARB. 251, 267 (2006) (“It is clear that 
proper application of the unconscionability doctrine involves an assessment of the contract ex 
ante, rather than ex post.”). 
 233. Id. 
 234. Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Alabama v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 91 n.6 (2000). 
 235. Bradford v. Rockwell Semiconductor Sys., Inc., 238 F.3d 549, 556 (4th Cir. 2001). See 
also Ware, supra note 232 at 286–87 (arguing that a “costs-based challenge to an arbitration 
agreement . . . should fail unless the total cost the plaintiff faces in arbitration significantly 
exceeds the total cost the plaintiff would face in litigation”). 
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did note Randolph’s showing of estimated arbitration costs in 
footnote six.236 It was these estimates, based on the arbitration 
agreement’s silence as to forum and fees, that were too speculative 
for the plaintiff to carry her burden. But the Court did not say 
analysis of arbitration costs in some manner is inappropriate—thus, 
courts are left with two options: comparing arbitration costs to the 
claimant’s ability to pay (the subjective approach) or comparing 
arbitration costs to the litigation forum (the comparative approach). 
By tracing the roots of the “prohibitive costs” doctrine back to 
Mitsubishi, it becomes even more likely that the Court intended any 
cost-based defense to be based on a comparison of the costs of 
arbitration to the judicial forum. Mitsubishi’s preservation of a 
defense based on the prospective litigant’s ability to vindicate its 
statutory rights focused on the availability of vindication in the 
arbitral, as opposed to the judicial forum.237 Further, the Court left 
open the possibility that a party could contest the enforcement of 
dispute resolution in arbitration on the basis that it would “be so 
gravely difficult and inconvenient that [the resisting party] will for 
all practical purposes be deprived of his day in court.”238 Gilmer 
confirms the hypothesis that the comparative framework is 
appropriate. Instead of focusing on the financial inequities between 
the Gilmer plaintiff and his employer, the Court held that the 
employee must arbitrate his ADEA claim.239 Finally, during the oral 
argument of American Express, Justice Scalia confirmed that in his 
view, at least, the comparison of costs must be costs in arbitration as 
compared to those present in litigation.240 
Further, use of the comparative costs approach would strike the 
 
 236. Id. 
 237. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 637. This is true even if the Court continues to limit Mitsubishi 
to the right to pursue statutory remedies as it was limited in dicta in American Express. See supra 
notes 207–10 and accompanying text. 
 238.  Mistubishi, 473 U.S. at 632–33 (quoting The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 
U.S. 1, 12 (1907)). 
 239. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 32 (1991). Indeed, the Court 
did not even mention the plaintiff’s financial status as relevant, even though Gilmer did argue 
that the “unequal bargaining power” between he and his employer should be a basis for refusing 
to enforce the agreement. Id. at 32–33. 
 240. Transcript of Oral Argument at 32–33, Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. 
Ct. 594 (2012) (Scalia, J., to Appellant Q: “Let me ask you. Your effective vindication principle 
depends upon a comparison with what you could do in Court. . . . You have to compare it to 
court. If you couldn’t do it in court, you don’t have to be able to do it in arbitration, it seems to 
me.”). Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, did not engage in this analysis in American Express. 
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appropriate balance between the purpose of the FAA, which is to put 
arbitration agreements on equal footing with other contracts, and 
adequately ensuring that the prospective litigant has not waived 
effective vindication of statutory rights. For example, if due to fee-
splitting provisions the arbitrator’s fee, filing fee, administrative 
costs, and other true “arbitral costs” made arbitration five times 
more expensive to arbitrate a discrimination claim than a litigant 
would face in court, it is no far stretch to say that arbitration is 
prohibitively expensive, and is not the kind of equally adequate 
substitute forum for a judicial forum that Mitsubishi envisioned. This 
should be true even if the prospective litigant is Warren Buffet and 
can truly afford the arbitration, regardless of the costs. Of course, 
this premise fits neatly within the original purpose of arbitration: “to 
keep the effort and expense required to resolve a dispute within 
manageable bounds.”241 Indeed, given the rising costs of arbitration 
proceedings today in commercial disputes, it would be advantageous 
to all post-dispute litigants to determine whether they truly are 
better off in arbitration than the courts (considering all factors, 
including what should be streamlined discovery and proceedings, 
reduced motions practice, and the use of arbitrators with expertise to 
alleviate the costs of experts). 
Another attractive reason for courts to employ the comparative 
approach is that it is relatively simple. Courts are well-attuned to the 
costs of proceeding in the judicial forum (filing fees, jury fees, costs 
of discovery, etc.). Thus, the prohibitive costs question should focus 
on: (1) how much will this arbitration cost (i.e., what are the non-
litigation based fees and costs involved); and (2) what is the 
differential between arbitration and litigation? Indeed, had the 
Second Circuit applied this framework to the Amex line of cases in 
2009, when the plaintiffs first contested individual arbitration based 
on the excessive costs of their proposed expert fees,242 the 
resolution would have been relatively straightforward. The Amex 
 
 241. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 633 (1985). 
As the Mitsubishi Court noted, “adaptability and access to expertise are hallmarks of arbitration. 
The anticipated subject matter of the dispute may be taken into account when the arbitrators are 
appointed, and arbitral rules typically provide for the participation of experts either employed by 
the parties or appointed by the tribunal.” Id. 
 242. Of course, one must note that having the proposed expert for the analysis also opine 
as to the necessary fees involved is a bit like putting the child in the candy shop—the expert has 
every incentive to shoot the moon and inflate the fees that he or she will likely ultimately be 
paid if the case goes forward. 
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plaintiffs did not contend, and would have conceded, that the expert 
fees would be less in pursuing individual litigation as opposed to 
arbitration. The crux of their argument was that at least in litigation, 
they could proceed as a class and share the costs. But the fact is that 
it is not arbitration as compared to litigation that was prohibitively 
expensive—as expert analysis would have been necessary in both—
but rather, it was proceeding individually as opposed to a collective 
action.243 Given the antitrust dispute at issue and the parties’ 
freedom in selecting the arbitrator, one would think they would 
select an arbitrator well-versed enough in market analyses to cut 
through some of the necessity of the costly expert testimony. In 
other words, the parties should hire an expert in antitrust as 
arbitrator to simplify and narrow the issues in the case.244 
The response to this argument is that given the modest amount 
of damages involved, no individual litigant will bring the case. While 
I dispute that idea in American Express, in which some litigants stood 
to gain as much as $38,000 and the median damages were $1,751–
$5,252, the theory may be viable in other truly low value claims, 
such as claims for $30. This raises the two remaining frameworks 
courts have used to assess a prohibitive costs defense—the cost-
benefit approach and the incentive approach. 
Under the cost-benefit approach, a court tasked with 
determining whether a litigant should be bound by a pre-dispute 
arbitration agreement would compare the likely costs of proceeding 
in arbitration (again, this should be true arbitral costs, not costs 
necessarily bound up in litigation) as compared to the potential 
 
 243. But there are other ways the plaintiffs could have availed themselves of cost-sharing 
mechanisms. First, it is not clear at all that American Express’s “confidentiality provision” 
would have prevented the plaintiffs from hiring an expert to do the same market analysis, and 
different damages calculations for each. Indeed, American Express conceded that the 
confidentiality provision would not prevent some sharing of expert theory between plaintiffs, 
and later agreed plaintiffs could completely share the costs of the expert. Transcript of Oral 
Argument at 4, Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 594 (2012) (Attorney for 
Petitioners, admitting that “we have conceded below that the parties could share the costs of 
that expert just as they could share the costs of a lawyer.”). Further, as Chief Justice Roberts 
reminded the litigants, nothing would have prevented a trade association made up of the 
litigants (or a hedge fund funding the litigation) from funding the base research and analysis of 
the expert report, which could then have been used by each litigant in each individual 
arbitration. Id. at 20–21. 
 244. The parties may still have to present individual expert opinions on individual issues, 
such as damages, but as to central issues—one would think a leading expert in the field would 
need little more input from the parties’ competing expert opinions. 
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likelihood of recovery. As this analysis has been employed in the 
past, particularly with respect to the class-action waiver, if the costs 
of proceeding in arbitration were higher than the potential likely 
recovery, then the arbitration clause may be invalidated on the 
grounds that no rational litigant would vindicate that claim. On its 
face, the problems inherent in such an analysis abound. First, each 
decision about whether to resolve a dispute necessarily involves 
some cost-benefit analysis, whether in court or in an alternative 
forum. Even in court, pursuing claims is far from free, and the 
litigant must question, are my potential damages sufficient, coupled 
with my risk of losing, to justify the costs, the time, the stress and 
potential emotional drain? The decision to arbitrate is no different. 
Now, as argued above, if the decision to arbitrate leads to much 
higher costs than litigation, it may be that the arbitration agreement 
is acting as an unenforceable waiver of statutory rights. But simply 
requiring the litigant to make a decision about whether a claim is 
worthy of time, money, and effort is asking no more of the arbitral 
litigant than the judicial. 
Further still, the focal point of the parties’ agreement should be 
ex ante—at the time they entered into the arbitration agreement, not 
after a dispute has arisen and damages may be great or they may be 
de minimis. It could very well be that parties would inherently waive 
their access to courts (which certainly is not free), or governance by 
the discovery procedures required by the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, and hence, inherently agree that “small value claims” are 
not worth very much of their time, in exchange for the ease of 
bringing more lucrative claims in a more efficient forum.245 By 
shifting the focus to the damages likely to be recovered by a claim 
that arises after the parties have agreed to arbitrate, the court 
improperly shifts the position or intent of the parties from ex ante to 
ex post. In sum, if it were true that merely having a claim that is not 
sufficiently lucrative to justify the expense of arbitration were 
enough to launch a defense based on the effective vindication of 
statutory rights, then the court system would equally fail, because no 
one in their right mind would assert a claim for $30 in court, if the 
filing fee was $30 or more. Indeed, in many arbitration agreements 
that have surfaced in recent years, the litigant with presumed 
unequal bargaining power (a consumer, for example), is actually 
 
 245. See Lampley, supra note 14, at 512–17. 
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better off in arbitration, fully funded by his opponent, and with the 
possibility of a windfall if an appropriate settlement is not reached, 
than in court. 
 
The incentive-based framework suffers from the same infirmities 
as does the cost-benefit framework. It may be that the parties were 
quite willing, at the time of the agreement, to forego any incentive to 
assert low-value claims. And, in low-value claims, there will also be a 
question of whether there is any incentive for litigants to pursue 
those claims. But the incentive-based approach has deeper problems, 
because it is a policy-based reason to invalidate an otherwise valid 
contractual agreement. Recall that under an incentive-based 
framework, the assumption is that the plaintiff can be made whole in 
arbitration, but lacks any incentive to pursue the claim and therefore 
is not capable of vindicating statutory rights. But by creating 
statutory rights, such as antitrust claims, anti-discrimination claims, 
and predatory lending claims, Congress did not simultaneously 
demand that every litigant always enforce those rights. Indeed, the 
Mitsubishi Court recognized in the context of a Sherman Act claim 
that the “cause of action remains at all times under the control of the 
individual litigant: no citizen is under an obligation to bring an 
antitrust suit, and the private antitrust plaintiff needs no executive 
or judicial approval before settling one.”246 And because the class 
waiver does not interfere with the right to pursue federal claims in 
arbitration (or litigation, for that matter), the Court rejected the 
incentive-based approach in American Express.247 
Thus, in the same way that a litigant may choose to settle a 
particularly complex, expensive, or risky statutory claim for cents on 
the dollar, a prospective contractual party may accept forgoing one 
set of incentives (the incentive to pursue low-value claims as a 
member of a class) for another (the incentive to arbitrate, potentially 
at a lower premium than litigation, more meritorious claims in 
exchange for a higher rate of recovery). Because the cost-benefit 
approach and the incentive approach have no proper place in the 
Court’s “vindication of statutory rights” jurisprudence or contractual 
theory, they should not be employed by courts as frameworks under 
which to invalidate pre-dispute arbitration agreements. 
 
 246. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 636. 
 247. See supra note 218 and accompanying text. 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
Since Randolph, courts have struggled with how to evaluate 
prohibitive costs as a defense to arbitration under the “vindication of 
statutory rights” defense. Courts, depending on the context of the 
dispute, have employed four different frameworks, or a hybrid of 
each: (1) the subjective approach, which compares the costs of 
arbitration to the litigant’s ability to pay; (2) the comparative 
approach, which compares the costs of arbitration to the costs of 
proceeding in litigation; (3) the cost-benefit approach, which 
compares the costs of arbitration to the likelihood of plaintiff’s 
potential recovery; and (4) the incentive-based approach, which 
considers whether the plaintiffs or their potential attorneys have any 
incentive given the costs involved, to pursue their claims. An 
analysis of the genesis of the “vindication of statutory rights 
defense” and the purposes it serves, that of the FAA and federal 
comity, reveals that the only framework that courts should employ 
to render an arbitration agreement unenforceable due to prohibitive 
costs is one that contrasts true arbitration costs from those that 
would be incurred in the judicial forum. Although the Supreme 
Court inherently rejected the incentive-based approach in American 
Express, it offered no guidance to lower courts as to what costs 
should be considered in analyzing a cost-based defense, other than to 
question the bases of the cost-based defense. Despite the Court’s 
questionable narrowing of Mitsubishi’s “effective vindication” 
doctrine, a viable defense based on truly prohibitive costs should still 
exist, as the Court has never overruled Mitsubishi, Randolph, or any of 
the cases recognizing arbitration as an alternative forum for 
vindicating such rights. But the proper framework for analyzing such 
a defense is whether the costs of the arbitral forum as opposed to the 
judicial forum (i.e. costs only incurred in arbitration) pose a 
prohibitive barrier to pursuing those federal statutory claims. 
